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his or her school. School is a place for learning and growing. Sexual harass-
ment stops that process."'
INTRODUCTION
Commentators have called it the "kiss that shook the nation"2-a
Lexington, North Carolina school suspended six-year-old first-grader
Johnathan Prevette for a day when he kissed a schoolmate on the
cheek.3 Johnathan told his mother that the little girl asked him to kiss
her,4 but the school's principal decided the display of affection vio-
lated a "school policy on 'student-to-student sexual harassment,'
[which] includ[es] pressure for sex, flirting, patting, and pinching."5
I OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACA-
DEMIC 1 (1997) (omission in original) (quoting N. STEIN & LISA SJOSTRAM, FLIRTING OR
HURTING? A TEACHER'S GUIDE ON STUDENT TO STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS
66 (1994)).
2 Debra Carlton Harrell, Kiss May Be a Kiss, But Teen Sex Harassment No Joke, SAN
DIEGO UNoN-TIB., Oct. 12, 1996, at E5.
s See Andrew Phillips, Kissing and Correctness, MAcLEAN's, Oct. 14, 1996, at 49.
4 See Boy, 6, Punished for Kissing Classmate, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Sept. 25, 1996,
at B1.
5 Phillips, supra note 3, at 49. But see Ellen Goodman, The Truth Behind "the Kiss,"
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 1996, at D7 (stating that the school did not suspend Johnathan,
but sent him to another room for misbehavior, and that the school did not characterize his
act as sexual harassment, but as "unwanted touching that violated the student behavior
code"); Paul Nowell, Boy's Kiss Brings Him International Fame, GREENSBORO NEws & REc.,
Sept. 26, 1996, at BI ("The student was disciplined for violation of the general school rule
which prohibits unwarranted and unwelcome touching of one student by another ....
Unfortunately, references have been made to sexual harassment, which in its usual con-
text, is not involved in this case." (quoting the school administration)). Despite his out-
raged parents' complaints and the mayor's admission that the policy was "flawed," Phillips,
supra note 3, at 49, the school stood by its decision, calling the disciplinary action "justi-
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A month later, seven-year-old second-grader De'Andre Dearinge of
Queens, New York found himself in a similar predicament, when
school officials suspended him for five days for violating the school
board's policy against sexual harassment because he kissed a classmate
and tore a button off her skirt.6 De'Andre admitted that he kissed the
girl because he liked her, and explained he removed the button be-
cause it reminded him of Corduroy, the teddy bear in his favorite
book who is missing a button from his overalls.7
Stories likeJohnathan's and De'Andre's are enough to make any-
one wonder, have school officials lost their minds? The extensive me-
dia coverage sparked "a blizzard of charges that the boys were victims
of political correctness run amok,"8 and that America was "going over-
board" with sexual harassment in general. 9 Many articles pointed out
that the children were too young to grasp the concept of sex, let alone
fled." Nowell, supra. The case made headlines across the country, turningJohnathan into
an instant celebrity with appearances on CNN, the "Today Show," and NBC News. See id.
Johnathan's mother plans to take legal action against Lexington school officials for their
punishment of her son. See Conservative Group to Defend 6-Year-Old, NEws & OBSERVER, Oct.
9, 1996, at A3. The North Carolina Fund for Individual Rights, a conservative civil rights
group, is providing free legal representation to the Prevette family. See id.
6 See Seven-Year-Old Suspended 5 Days for Kissing Classmate BuFALo NEWs, Oct. 2,1996,
at A16 [hereinafter Seven-Year-Old Suspended] ("School officials said their guidelines define
sexual harassment as sexually suggestive comments, innuendoes or propositions; or inap-
propriate physical contact such as touching, patting or pinching.... No minimum age is
set.").
7 See id. Following criticism of the extreme nature of the punishment from many,
including De'Andre's mother, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and sexual harass-
ment experts, and after attracting national media attention, school administrators allowed
De'Andre to return to school after he sered only three days of his suspension. See BethJ.
Harpaz, School Officials Abandon Punishment for Stolen Kiss, Citics Called Penalty Political Cor-
rectness Run Amok, BuFALo NEWs, Oct. 3, 1996, at A5 ("'It appears as if this was kind of a
normal, childish thing that happened and was misinterpreted.... It seems somebody
made a mistake.'") (quoting Mayor Giuliani); Norimitsu Onishi, Harassment in 2d Grade?
Queens Kisserls Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at Al ("'Clearly, Tide IX doesn't reach a
little boy kissing a girl.'") (quoting Verna Williams, Attorney, National Women's Law
Center); New York Boy, 7, Cleared of Sexual Harassment Charges for Kissing Classmate, JEr, Oct.
21, 1996, at 53 (noting that De'Andere's incident followed on the heels ofJohnathan's in
North Carolina and that it again captivated widespread media attention, prompting school
officials to consider amending harassment policies to "reflect age considerations").
8 Phillips, supra note 3, at 49; see also Harrell, supra note 2, at E5 (stating that the
schools' reaction to Johnathan and De'Andre's cases were "widely perceived as overreac-
tions by school districts trying to be politically and legally correct").
9 Sally Lehrman, Schools Learn the Hard Way: Harassment Not Child's Play, S.F. EXAM-
INER, Oct. 3, 1996, at Al (quoting a professor as saying that "high-profile" suspensions like
Johnathan's and De'Andre's "helped fuel a sense that schools were going overboard in
their effort to respond to sexual harassment").
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sexual harassment.10 One critic told the nation's educators to "worry
about teaching, not trivialities."" I I
Unfortunately, "high-profile" stories like these distract attention
from the very real problem of sexual harassment that faces older stu-
dents in America's public schools. 12 Routine, nonheadline-making
stories reveal serious incidents of intimidation and unwelcomed sex-
ual contact that many girls experience every day in the classroom, the
hallway, on the school bus, and the playground.' 3 At school, "young
girls are repeatedly exposed to attitudes and behaviors that frighten,
intimidate, and degrade them."' 4 In fact, sexual harassment is so
common that many girls assume it is just part of the ordinary school
day'5-"a lot of people do it, it's no big deal."16
The reality of the situation leads many critics to complain that
"the biggest problem with sexual harassment [in America's schools] is
not overreaction, but a failure to react where warranted.' 7 Perhaps
10 See, e.g., Fred Bruning, An American View: Going Overboard on Sexual Harassmen
MAcLRAN's, Oct. 21, 1996, at 15 (criticizing the punishment of children "so young they
have notions neither of sex nor harassment"); Onishi, supra note 7, at B8 ("'I have a prob-
lem with holding little ones to the same standard you would hold adults to in the work-
place.'") (quoting Carol A. Gressner, Queens representative to the school board); Seven-
Year-Old Suspended, supra note 6 ("De'Andre couldn't say what sex means.") (citing The
Daily News).
11 Bruning, supra note 10, at 15.
12 See Lehrman, supra note 9, at Al.
13 See NAN STEIN, SECRETs IN PUBuc: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN PUBLIC (AND PRIVATE)
SCHOOLS 2 (rev. ed. 1993); Goodman, supra note 5, at D7.
14 Kirsten M. Eriksson, Note, What Our Children Are Really Learning in Schook Using Title
IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassmen4 83 GEo. L.J. 1799, 1800 (1995); see also Carol Jones,
Sexual Tyranny: Male Violence in a Mixed Secondary School inJust A BUNCH OF GIRLS: FEMINIST
APPROACHES TO SCHOOLING 26, 35 (Gaby Weiner ed., 1985) (concluding that because of
sexual harassment, "mixed-sex schools are dangerous places for girls and women and...
they exist to further benefit boys as they establish their sexual domination over girls").
15 See NANCY S. LAYMAN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS: A
LEGAL GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS, TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 34 (1994); STEIN, supra note
13, at 2; Jones, supra note 14, at 28. June Larkin, in her interviews of young Canadian
students, uncovered three factors that contribute to female students' systematic acceptance
of their male counterparts' sexually harassing behavior: "(1) the frequency of the
behavi[or]; (2) the way it was interpreted by others, particularly the male harassers; and
(3) the fact that the topic of sexual harassment was seldom, if ever, discussed at school."
June Larkin, Walking Through Walls: The Sexual Harassment of High School Girls, 6 GENDER &
EDUCATION 263, 266 (1994).
16 AMERICAN Ass'N OF UNIv. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLwAYS: THE AAUW
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 12 (1993) (noting that 37% of stu-
dent perpetrators of sexual harassment gave the "no big deal" explanation for their behav-
ior) [hereinafter AAUW SURVEY].
17 Harrell, supra note 2, at E5 (citing local and national school officials, students,
teachers, child psychologists, attorneys and other experts); see also AAUW Survey, supra
note 16, at 21 (indicating that parents, teachers, and school officials have failed to recog-
nize the extent of sexual harassment in schools); JoAnn Strauss, Peer Sexual Harassment of
High School Students: A Reasonable Student Standard and an Affirmative Duty Imposed on Educa-
tional Institutions, 10 LAw & INEQ. J. 163, 165 (1992) (noting that "[s] exual harassment is
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educators "ignore, downplay or [are] unaware of sexual harassment"
because they do not from the outset identify certain student conduct
as sexual and harassing in nature.18 However, the recent flurry of law-
suits that students and parents have brought against school districts,
alleging peer sexual harassment,19 has done much to focus attention
on the growing problem of sexual harassment in our schools.20
Consider, for example, the story of Tianna Ugarte, a young girl
living in California who, as an eleven-year-old sixth-grader, suffered
sexual harassment by a classmate for an entire year.2' For ten months,
the boy verbally assaulted Tianna with regular, explicit vulgarities, 22
repeatedly calling her "bitch," "slut," "whore,"23 and other degrading
sexual slurs and epithets in front of other classmates. 24 The student
also grabbed his own groin, questioned Tianna why her breasts were
not bigger,2 5 and even threatened her after she complained.2 6
Tianna's father, seeing that his daughter was living in fear,27 com-
plained repeatedly to the boy's family, Tianna's teacher, and the
school's principal and superintendent. 28 The principal promised to
investigate the matter, but the superintendent later told Tianna's par-
ents that he was powerless to act, absent proof of the allegations.2 9
Tianna's case attracted national headlines when a jury awarded her
$500,000 in damages and attorney's fees, finding unanimously that
prevalent in high school in the guise of 'teasing' and all too often the reaction to such
harassment is 'boys will be boys'").
18 JOHN F. LEWIs & SusAN C. HASTINGS, SExuAL HARASSMENT IN EDUCATION 20 (2d ed.
1994).
19 See, e.g., infra Part II.
20 See Harrell, supra note 2, at E5.
21 See Ray Delgado, Girl Wins Harassment Suit Against Schook Antioch District Found Negli-
gent in Response to Boy's Taunting of Classmate, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 1996, at Al.
22 See Phillips, supra note 3, at 49.
23 See Delgado, supra note 21, at Al.
24 See Bill Hewitt et al., Bitter Lessons: School Days Aren't Golden Rule Days Anymore, and
Some Parents Are Suing to Keep Their Kids From Being Abused, PEOPLE, Oct. 28, 1996, at 52, 53.
During the four-week trial of Tianna's case, the school district argued, among other things,
"that Tianna was too sensitive." Delgado, supra note 21, at A14.
25 See Phillips, supra note 3, at 49.
26 Delgado, supra note 21, at Al.
27 See Tamar Lewin, Kissing Cases Highlight Schools' Fears of Liability for Sexual Harass-
ment N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 22. According to Tianna's father, she had become "'very
sullen and isolated .... [S]he would come home and lock the door to her room. She
stopped her dance. Her self-esteem withered away. Ijust wanted to protect my daughter.'"
I1d (quoting Tianna's father).
28 See i
29 See Hewitt et al., supra note 24, at 53. Superintendent Alan J. Newell stated, "'We
did investigate, and our investigations concluded there was some name-calling, but never
verified any of the other allegations .... We're not bashful about discipline. But we didn't
have the evidence to corroborate the complaint.'" Lewin, supra note 27, at 22 (quoting
Superintendent Newell).
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the Antioch Unified School District negligently handled Tianna's nu-
merous sexual harassment complaints.a0
Similarly, Eve Bruneau, an eleven-year-old from upstate New
York, informed her father and mother that her sixth-grade class "had
become a nightmare."3 ' Boys, she told them, would regularly snap
girls' bras, fondle their breasts, and taunt them with names like "les-
bian," "prostitute," and "whore.3' 2 One boy called Eve an "ugly, dog-
faced bitch."33 Adding insult to injury, Eve's teacher took no action to
stop the boys' behavior.3 4 After Eve's parents complained, the teacher
attempted to make a boy who had insulted her apologize.3 5 When the
boy refused, the teacher told Eve, "'guys are going to call you names
all your life, and you're going to have to deal with it.'36 After the
teacher and other school officials ignored their complaints, her par-
ents enrolled Eve in a boarding school in Massachusetts. 37 In the first
such case in New York,38 Eve sued the South Kortright Central School
District in federal court for monetary damages under Title IX, alleg-
ing that school officials knowingly failed to protect her from the sex-
ual harassment.3 9 Unfortunately for Eve, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the school district, concluding that "the school's sex dis-
crimination and harassment laws apply only to adults, like teachers
and staff, not to students."4°
Who is responsible for monitoring and preventing sexual harass-
ment between students?41 While sexual harassment in the workplace
30 See Delgado, supra note 21, at Al. The jurors based their decision on the school's
failure to implement a 1993 California law "banning sexual harassment in schools." Lehr-
man, supra note 9, at Al. The law, passed on January 1, 1993, required every California
school district to adopt a sexual harassment policy, and the Antioch School District did not
adopt this policy until the middle of May 1993, "put[ting] the district in violation of state
law for five and a half months." Doe v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 763135 (T.D.
Cal. Jury) at *1-*2; see also CAi_ EDuc. CODE § 212.6 (West 1998) (providing that "[e]ach
educational institution in the state of California shall have a written policy on sexual har-
assment [included] in its regular policy statement").
31 Hewitt, et al., supra note 24, at 54.
32 Id. at 55.
33 Id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 SeeJohn Caher, When a TeaseIsn't Seen as a Taunt TIMESUNION, Nov. 3, 1996, atAl.
38 Girl Presses State's First Case Alleging Sexual Harassment in Grade Schoo N.Y. Timss,
Nov. 4, 1996, at B3.
39 See Bruneau by Schofield v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 166-
67 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
40 Lost Battle, BuJ rAo NEws, Dec. 17, 1996, at 12. "Afterward, most jurors said they
sympathized with Bruneau's case, but said they thought district officials had done all they
could to correct the situation once they became aware of it." Girl Loses Suit Claiming Sex
Harassment at Schoo TIMs UNioN, Nov. 22, 1996, at Al.
41 See, e.g., Elaine D. Ingulli, Sexual Harassment in Education, 18 RUTGEms L.J. 281, 282-
83 (1987) (arguing that "faculty, through their institutions, unions and professional as-
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has attracted widespread judicial attention in the last three decades,
and employers are now held legally responsible for sexual harassment
among their employees, 42 neither courts nor school officials have ade-
quately addressed the serious problem of student-to-student sexual
harassment. 43 Due to current judicial disagreement regarding the
standard for liability of school districts under Tite IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 197244 ("Title IX") for peer sexual harassment,
school officials remain uncertain about their legal duty when one stu-
dent makes unwelcomed sexual advances toward another student.45
Nevertheless, understanding the potential for liability is the first step
educators must take in resolving this pressing problem.
Part I of this Note begins by examining the statutory language of
Title IX and its legislative history. Part I also examines the develop-
ment of the law's recognition of sexual harassment as sex discrimina-
tion under Title IX, and looks at the prevalence of peer sexual
harassment in America's primary and secondary schools and its im-
pact on victims and perpetrators. Part II outlines the current judicial
disagreement over whether, and under what circumstances, schools
should be held liable for peer sexual harassment, and analyzes the
conflicting theories of liability that the federal courts currently ad-
vance. Part III argues that schools should be held liable for student-
to-student sexual harassment under Title IX by implementing a stan-
dard similar to that governing employer liability for sexual harassment
under Title VII. Part IV offers some suggestions to schools seeking to
avoid potential financial liability in the current climate of judicial
uncertainty.
sociations should be in the forefront of developing ethical standards that enhance the
academic and intellectual environment for all students by seriously attacking the problem
of sexual harassment on campus"); Strauss, supra note 17, at 181-82 (posing the imposition
of an affirmative duty on school districts to deal with sexual harassment).
42 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); see also Strauss, supra note
17, at 165 (noting that "[s]exual harassment is well-documented and analyzed in the
workplace").
43 See Verna L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Isn'tJust a Kiss: Title IX and
Student-to-Student Harassment 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 423, 424 (1997) ("The difficulty
schools are having addressing student-to-student harassment reflects the disarray in the
courts in this emerging area of the law.").
44 Pub. L. No. 92-318 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994)).
45 See Williams & Brake, supra note 43, at 424.
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I I
TrrTLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
A. The Statutory Language and Legislative History of Title IX
The enactment of Title IX was "the culmination of efforts over
several years to ban gender discrimination in the field of education."46
By enacting Title IX, Congress intended to eradicate sex discrimina-
tion in federally funded educational programs and activities by
preventing "the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices." 47 It also sought to protect individual citizens from those
discriminatory practices. 48
Title IX filled the gender gap in civil rights legislation that Title
VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI" and "Title
VII," respectively) 49 left, and closed "loopholes in existing legislation
relating to general education programs and employment resulting
from those programs."50 Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race and national origin in any federally funded program, but does
not address sex discrimination. 51 Title VII makes it an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex,
but does not include educational institutions within its scope.52 Using
46 Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 555
(1984).
47 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); see also Bel, 687 F.2d at 691-
93 (emphasizing Congress's intent to prevent use of all federal monies for discriminatory
purposes); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (explaining
that Title IX "was intended to prevent the use of federal resources to support gender dis-
crimination."), aft'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (stating that
"the heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in educational
programs receiving Federal funds") (statement of Senator Bayh).
48 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
49 See 117 CONG. Rxc. 30,411 (1971) ("There is a gap in the laws protecting women
from biased educational policies.") (statement of Senator Cook). For the text of Title IX,
see Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1686 (1994)).
50 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh).
51 Title VI states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
52 Title VII states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1). Congress added the prohibition against sex discrimination in the em-
ployment context at the last minute as a floor amendment in the House of Representatives,
without any hearing or debate. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986)
(citing 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964)); see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662
(9th Cir. 1977)). One conservative Congressman proposed the amendment in an effort to
entirely thwart the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Uane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
However, this ruse failed and the bill passed quickly as amended. See id.
1998] 1021
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terms similar to those of Title VI, Tide IX specifically provides that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." 53
Senator Bayh first introduced the provisions that became Tide IX
as an amendment 54 to the Education Amendments of 1971. 55 Advo-
cating his proposed amendment, Senator Bayh stated that
[t]he bill deals with equal access to education. Such access should
not be denied because of poverty or sex. If we are going to give all
students an equal education, women must finally be guaranteed
equal access to education.... It does not do any good to pass out
hundreds of millions of dollars if we do not see that the money is
applied equitably to over half our citizens. 56
Specifically, Senator Bayh's amendment focused on gender discrimi-
nation in school admissions and employment opportunities for female
teachers,57 and aimed at correcting a disturbing statistical imbalance:
only nine percent of college professors, six percent of law students,
and eight percent of medical school students were women.58
When the bill passed through the legislative process and returned
to the Senate floor without an antidiscrimination provision,59 Senator
53 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (emphasis added). Legislative history demonstrates that Congress
believed it was "only adding the 3-letter word 'sex' to existing law," and was "not doing
anything to the private school that [was] not [already] in the law under Tide VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, relating to discrimination in other areas." 117 CoNG. REc. 30,408 (1971)
(statement of Senator Bayh).
54 Senator Bayh's first amendment provided that
[nJo person ... shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of or be subject to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or
any school or department of graduate education, which is a recipient of
Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity.
117 CONG REc. 30,156 (1971) (statement of Senator Bayh).
55 See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 692 (3d Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 555
(1984). The Education Amendments of 1971 established the Basic Educational Opportu-
nity Grant program, see id., whose primary concern was:
the availability of educational facilities to low-income students .... the qual-
ity of education provided by the nation's educational institutions and their
need for funding to bolster programs and facilities,. . . the establishment of
continuing education programs for the nation's teachers, and most pre-
dominately,... the sensitive issue of busing.
Kimberly A. Mango, Comment, Student's Versus Professors: Conbatting Sexual Harassment
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 355, 373 (1991).
56 117 CONG. REc. 30,412 (1971) (statement of Senator Bayh).
57 See id. at 30,155-56 (statement of Senator Bayh).
58 See id. at 30,411 (statement of Senator McGovern).
59 The Senate rejected Senator Bayh's first amendment to the educational bill as non-
germane, see 117 CONG. REc. 30,415 (1971), and passed the bill without the antidiscrimina-
tion provision. The House, after considering the Senate's version, replaced it with its own
educational bill, including an antidiscrimination provision, and passed its own version of
1022 [Vol. 83:1014
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Bayh again introduced an antidiscrimination amendment, adding the
language that is now Title IX.60 Legislative debate concerning Title
IX "reflected an awareness that opportunity for women was restricted
throughout American education and, further, that denying women
equal educational opportunity also denies them equal opportunity in
employment."6' 1 Senator Bayh stressed the link between discrimina-
tion in education and employment:
The field of education is just one of many areas where differential
treatment has been documented; but because education provides
access to jobs and financial security, discrimination here is doubly
destructive for women. Therefore, a strong and comprehensive
measure is needed to provide women with solid legal protection
from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to
perpetuate second-class citizenship for American women.62
Senator Bayh thought his provision would "cover such crucial aspects
as admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment.163
B. Recognizing Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination Under
Title IX: Step One in Achieving Gender Equality in Schools
Although Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in education, it
does not explicitly proscribe sexual harassment. As one commentator
has observed, "historically, the majority of Title IX lawsuits have been
filed by plaintiffs attempting to gain equal funding or opportunities
for women."6 4 The first cases brought under Title IX "primarily chal-
lenged discriminatory practices in athletic programs and admissions
policies,"6 5 alleging that these practices "did not provide equal access
the bill. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,882 (1971). The Senate referred the House version back to
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which amended it to conform to the original
Senate version. SeeS. RP. No. 92-604 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2595, 2595-96.
On February 7, 1972, the Senate Committee sent its own version of the education bill back
to the floor of the Senate, again without an anti-discrimination clause. See 118 CoNG. REc.
2806 (1972). For this same general discussion, see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
120 F.3d 1390, 1396-97 (11th Cir.) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S.
Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
60 See 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972).
61 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENFORCING TrILE IX, at 1 (1980).
62 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh).
63 Id. at 5803. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of Title IX, see Paul
C. Sweeney, Abuse, Misuse and Abrogation of the Use of Legislative History: Title IX and Peer
Sexual Harassmen 66 UMKC L. Rxv. 41, 46-67 (1997).
64 John T. Wolohan, Sexual Harassment of Students by Students: Do School Administrators
Have an Affirmative Duty to Prevent Such Conduct?, 103 EDUC. L. REP. 889, 893 (1995).
65 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91
F.3d 1418 (11th Cir.), rev'd en banc 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843). For a discussion of the success of Title
IX challenges to college athletic programs, see Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IM Toward an
Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105 (1991); Glenn M.
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to males and females."66 Judicial interpretations in these early law-
suits transformed Title IX "from a statute which prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex . . . into a statute which provides 'equal
opportunit[ies] for members of both sexes."' 67
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,68 until recently the
first and only Title IX sexual harassment case that the Supreme Court
had considered, 69 the Justices offered some hope to victims of sexual
harassment in the educational setting by unanimously holding that
schools can be held liable for monetary damages for violations of Title
IX. The plaintiff in Franklin, a female high school student, alleged
that a high school coach and teacher subjected her to continual sex-
ual harassment and abuse, including rape. 70 Furthermore, she al-
leged that school officials investigated and knew of the teacher's
conduct, yet failed to take action to protect her, and even discouraged
her from pressing charges against the teacher.71 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the com-
plaint, concluding that "Title IX does not authorize an award of dam-
ages,"72 and the Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed.73
Wong & Richard J. Ensor, Sex Discrimination in Athletics: A Review of Two Decades of Accom-
plishments and Defeats, 21 GONZ. L. REv. 345 (1985/86).
66 Daniel B. Tukel, Student Versus Student: School District Liability for Peer Sexual Harass-
ment, 75 MicH. B.J. 1154, 1154 (1996).
67 Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 241 (C.D. M]1. 1993)
(citation omitted), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
68 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
69 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to another Tite IX case involving a
teacher's sexual harassment of a student to determine "what standard should be used for
imposing liability on a school district for the intentional acts of one of its teachers." Cert.
Granted, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 22, 1997, at B18; see also Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106
F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (embracing a high standard of
institutional liability for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student). In Lag0 Vsta, the Fifth
Circuit held that the school district cannot be held liable under Title IX for such conduct
"unless an employee who has been vested by the school board with supervisory power over
the offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, and
failed to do so." Lago Vista, 106 F.3d at 1225-26 (citing Rose H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch.
Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997), and rejecting Title IX liability based on theories of strict
liability, constructive notice, and common law agency). The Court will hear oral argu-
ments both on the Gebser case and the Faragher case (involving the standard for employer
liability for Title VII sexual harassment) on March 25, 1998. See Linda Greenhouse, Court
to Examine Sex Harassment, Amplifying Earlier Decision, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1998, § 1, at 22
(reporting on the Supreme Court's acceptance of four cases this term involving sexual
harassment).
70 See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63. Plaintiff alleged that, among other conduct, the
teacher "engaged her in sexually oriented conversations .... forcibly kissed her on the
mouth ... [and] subjected her to coercive intercourse." Id. (citations omitted).
71 See id. at 64. After the complaint was filed, the teacher resigned on the condition
that the school drop all matters pending against him, at which point the school ended its
investigation. See id.
72 Id.
73 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503
U.S. 60 (1992).
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In reversing the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
stated that Title IX prohibits sexual harassment in public schools,74
and held that a damage remedy is available for those bringing an ac-
tion to enforce Title IX.75 Acknowledging that Title IX is enforceable
through an implied right of action,76 the Court relied on the long-
standing rule that "'[w]here legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done."''77 Therefore, unless Congress has specifically indicated other-
wise, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief
in a cause of action brought under a federal statute. 78
Franklin is significant not only because the Court awarded dam-
ages in an implied rights of action, but also because it protects stu-
dents from sexual harassment within the scope of prohibiting sex
discrimination in educational programs that receive federal fund-
ing.79 Issuing a strong statement against sexual harassment, the Court
wrote:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when
a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate [s]' on the basis of
sex." . . . We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher
sexually harasses and abuses a student.8 0
As the first reported federal case in which a student won a sexual har-
assment claim under Title IX,
the opinion is remarkable for its brevity and its almost casual tone.
Although sexual harassment in education is an issue of first impres-
74 See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
75 Id. at 75-76. Until the Court's Franklin decision in 1992, the denial of federal finan-
cial assistance to the offending educational institution "was the only remedy available to a
Tide IX plaintiff." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.),
vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. No. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
76 See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65 (stating that the implied private right of action under
Title IX recognized in Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) applies in cases of
intentional sexual harassment).
77 Franklin, 503 U.S. at.66 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
78 See id. at 68-69. In examining whether Congress specifically "intended to limit ap-
plication of this general principle in the enforcement of Tide IX," id. at 71, the court
found Title IX's text and legislative history "'silent' on the issue of available remedies," id.,
and concluded that Congress, legislating in light of the Cannon decision, did not intend to
limit the appropriate remedies and relief available to the courts for redressing violations of
the statute. Id. at 71-72.
79 See Joanne Liebman Matson, Note, Civil Rights-Sex Discrimination in Education-
Compensatory Damages Available in a Title IX Sexual Harassment Claim, 15 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK
L.J. 271, 291 (1993) (discussing the Franklin case).
80 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986)).
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sion for the Court, the Court limits its treatment of the issue to two
sentences, which are embedded in the discussion of whether institu-
ions have sufficient notice to justify imposing damage remedies on
them for Title IX violations.8 '
However, the "Court's decision to provide both legal and equitable
relief under Title IX"8 2 makes it a strong and effective weapon for
combatting both sexual harassment and sex discrimination in
schools.8 3 The Franklin decision was also consistent with the Court's
evolving jurisprudence in the area of sex discrimination and sexual
harassment in the workplace.8 4 Furthermore, by recognizing sexual
harassment as sex discrimination for purposes of Title IX, the Court
took an important and necessary step toward the achievement of gen-
der equality in education.
C. Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in America's Schools
As a result of the extensive media coverage of the Anita Hill-Clar-
ence Thomas hearings,8 5 the Senator Packwood scandal,86 the Navy's
Tailhook party in Las Vegas,8 7 and PaulaJones's lawsuit against Presi-
dent Clinton,88 the public has become increasingly aware of the perva-
81 Matson, supra note 79, at 293.
82 Elizabeth J. Gant, Comment, Applying Title VI "Hostile Work Environment"Analysis to
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972-An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to-Stu-
dent Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 Dica. L. REv. 489, 498 (1994).
83 See id.
84 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank., 477 U.S. at 66-67 (agreeing with the lower courts that
sexual harassment is an arbitrary barrier to gender equality in the workplace, and holding
that sexual harassment which is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's) employment and create an abusive working environment,'" is discrimination
based on sex and, therefore, is actionable under Title VII (alterations in original) (quoting
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
85 See, e.g., Anne C. Levy, Letter to the Editors, The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Hearings,
1991 Wis. L. Rxv. 1106, 1106-11 (expressing the hope that the hearings would heighten
consciousness about sexual harassment); Neil A. Lewis, Law Professor Accuses Thomas of Sex-
ual Harassment in 1980's, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at Al (reporting on Anita Hill's testi-
mony accusing then Supreme Court Justice nominee Clarence Thomas of sexual
harassment which sparked a national debate about sexual harassment in the workplace).
86 See, e.g., Excerpts from Senator Packwood's Diaries and Depositions by Accusers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1995, at D16 (excerpting selections from Senator Packwood's diaries); Katharine
Q. Seely, Packwood Says He Is Quitting as Ethics Panel Gives Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1995,
at Al (detailing Packwood's resignation from the Senate as a result of the Senate Ethics
Committee investigation of numerous sexual harassment and misconduct charges).
87 See, e.g., Gregory Vistica, Navy Ends Support of Tailhook in Wake of Sex-Abuse Charges,
SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRiB., Oct. 30, 1991, at Al (reporting on Navy Secretary Garrett's deci-
sion to terminate funding to the Talhook Association after reports of sexual harassment
and assault at an annual convention in Las Vegas).
88 See, e.g., Michael Isikoff et al., Clinton Hires Lawyer as Sexual Harassment Suit Is
Threatened, WASH. Posr, May 4, 1994, at Al (reporting on Paula Jones's appearance at a
news conference where she accused then Arkansas governor Bill Clinton of "making an
unwanted and improper sexual advance during a brief encounter" in a hotel room in
1991); Howard Kurtz, Paula Jones Speaks to National Media about Clinton Suit, WASH. POST,
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siveness of adult sexual harassment in the workplace. 89 "Until
recently, though, very little was known about the extent or the severity
of sexual harassment in American public schools."90 Recent develop-
ments do not paint a pretty picture: "sexual harassment is a major
problem for many students," and "[n] ot unlike like their adult coun-
terparts in the workplace, children in school are experiencing un-
wanted advances." 91
How widespread is sexual harassment in schools and how does it
affect our children? In June 1993, the American Association of Uni-
versity Women's Educational Foundation published Hostile Hallways:
The AAUW Survey of Sexual Harassment in America's Schools (the "AAUW
Survey"), the first major U.S. study to compile empirical data on
school-based sexual harassment. 92 The study's goal was to assess the
problem of sexual harassment in schools and its "educational, emo-
tional, and behavioral impact" on students.9 Public school students
in grades eight through eleven, from seventy-nine schools across the
country, completed 1,632 field surveys in February and March 1993.94
The survey defined sexual harassment for students as "unwanted and
unwelcome sexual behavior which interferes with your life."95 The sur-
vey listed fourteen types of harassment, involving both physical and
nonphysical contact, and asked: "During your whole school life, how
often, if at all, has anyone (this includes students, teachers, other
school employees, or anyone else) done the following things to you
when you did not want them to?"9 6 Students could answer "often, occa-
sionally, rarely, never, and not sure. '97
The results were alarming: 81%, or more than "4 out of 5 stu-
dents [had] experienced some form of sexual harassment in
June 17, 1994, at All (discussing Paula Jones's sudden high media profile four months
after unveiling her sexual harassment accusations).
89 See LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 12-14 (noting the public's increased awareness of
sexual harassment in the workplace as a result of the media's extensive coverage of high-
profile cases and related issues like child abuse and violence against women); Anne Bryant,
Sexual Harassment in School Takes Its To, USA TODAY MAG., Mar. 1995, at 40.
90 Bryant, supra note 89, at 40.
91 AAUW SuRvEY, supra note 16, at 3.
92 See Bryant, supra note 89, at 40.
93 AAUW SURVEY, supra note 16, at 4.
94 See id at 5.
95 Id. at 6. This definition explicitly excluded conduct that students might like or
want. See id.
96 Id. at 5. The surveys specifically instructed the students "to answer only about their
school-related experiences during school-related times." Id. at 6.
97 Id. at 6.
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school."9 8 Within this 81%, "the gender gap [was] surprisingly nar-
row": 85% of girls and 76% of boys surveyed said they had been the
targets of unwanted and unwelcome sexual conduct at school.99 The
most prevalent form of sexual harassment was "sexual comments,
jokes, gestures, or looks" (65%), the second most common was
"touching, grabbing and/or pinching in a sexual way" (53%).100 A
significant number of students reported someone "intentionally
brush[ing] up against [them] in a sexual way" (46%), mooning or
flashing (45%), and being the target of "sexual rumors" (37%).101
Who perpetrated this sexual harassment? Eighteen percent of
the 81% who had been targets of sexual harassment in school re-
ported that their harasser was a school employee, such as a teacher,
bus driver, or counselor.10 2 However, student-to-student sexual har-
assment was found to be four times more common than student har-
assment by a school employee.10 3 The overwhelming majority (79%)
of students who reported experiencing sexual harassment at school
identified their harasser as a present or former student.10 4
Sexual harassment that creates a hostile learning environment
impacts all students.' 0 5 However, the AAUW Survey clearly indicates
98 Id. at 4. For criticism of the survey, see John Leo, Expel Georgie Porgie Now!, U.S.
NEws & WoRLD REP., Oct. 14, 1996, at 37. Specifically, the author criticizes the survey
because it
got the school harassment rate up to 81 percent by including glances and
rumors as offenses. (With those standards, plus "body language," discussed
as harassment in [the survey], it's urprising the rate didn't hit 100 per-
cent.) The high number is used to depict sexual harassment as uniquely
awful, far more serious than other behavioral problems or than girl-to-girl
or boy-to-boy harassment, and in need of a strong curriculum reaching
down to potential 5- and 6-year-old offenders.
Id.
99 AAUW SuRvEY, supra note 16, at 7.
100 Id. at 8-9.
101 Id. In the other categories of sexual harassment, 33% of the students surveyed said
they had had their clothing pulled in a sexual manner; 32% had been "shown, given, or
left unwanted sexual pictures or notes"; 27% had been "blocked or cornered in a sexual
way"; 19% had been "the target of written sexual messages/graffiti"; 18% had been "forced
to kiss someone"; 17% had been "called gay or lesbian"; 16% had their "clothing pulled off
or down"; 11% had been "forced to do something sexual at school other than kissing"; and
lastly, 7% had been "spied on while they dress[ed] or shower[ed] at school." Id. at 9-10
(emphases omitted).
102 See id. at 10.
103 See id. at 11.
104 See id. For a smaller study of early adolescent experience with, and acceptance of,
sexually harassing behaviors, see Bruce Roscoe et al., Sexual Harassment: Early Adolescents'
Self-Reports of Experiences and Acceptance, 29 ADOLESCENCE 515, 519-20 (1994) (finding that of
the 281 females and 280 males surveyed, 50% of the females and 37% of the males re-
ported that their peers had sexually harassed them).
105 See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997) [hereinafter Sexual Harass-
ment Guidance] (noting that sexual harassment can "interfere with a student's academic
performance and emotional and physical well-being").
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that girls suffer greater negative educational, emotional, and behav-
ioral effects from harassment than boys. 106 Examining the educa-
tional impact, 33% of girls and 12% of boys reported "not wanting to
attend school" as a result of their experience with sexual harassment,
and 32% of girls and 13% of boys reported "not wanting to talk as
much in class" after experiencing harassment.10 7 Other effects in-
cluded finding it more difficult to pay attention in class (28% of girls,
13% of boys), deliberate absenteeism (24% of girls, 7% of boys), and
scoring lower on a test or paper (23% of girls, 9% of boys). 108 Stu-
dents also reported "[finding] it harder to study," earning a lower
grade in a class, changing schools, and doubting their ability to gradu-
ate as a result of their experiences with sexual harassment at school.10 9
Emotionally, students reported feeling "embarrassed" (64% of
girls, 36% of boys), "self-consciousness" (52% of girls, 21% of boys), a
loss of self-confidence (43% of girls, 14% of boys), and "afraid or
scared" (39% of girls, 8% of boys).110 They also reported doubting
whether they could "have a happy romantic relationship," as well as
feeling uncertain about their identity and feeling less or more popu-
lar."' As a result of the sexual harassment, many students altered
their behavior. They reported staying away from the person who
bothered or harassed them, avoiding particular locations in the
school, switching their seat in class, withdrawing from a school activity,
"changing their group of friends," and altering their route to and
from school.112
106 AAUW SuRvEY, supra note 16, at 15. Roscoe and his coauthor's study also demon-
strates that the experiences and consequences of sexually harassing behaviors were consid-
erably different for males and females, concluding that "[tihe gender of the harassment
perpetrator very likely influences the connotations and consequences of the behaviors to
the victim." Roscoe et al., supra note 104, at 520. Females experienced the sexually harass-
ing behaviors primarily from males and viewed these behaviors as "inappropriate, invasive,
disruptive, and causing a hostile environment .... [Their] experiences were consistent
with what is viewed as sexual harassment and resulted in conditions which adversely af-
fected the learning environment." Id. While males experienced harassing behaviors from
both men and women, physical harassment and sexual comments came almost entirely
from males and "typified a form of physical interaction which occurs among early adoles-
cent males as they explore and deal with physical change and a new dimension of their
sexuality." Id While many male students reported "a dislike for the behaviors when they
were the recipients, these behaviors did not appear to result in a hostile or offensive envi-
ronment which interfered with their ability to learn." Id.
107 AAUW SuRvEY, supra note 16, at 15.
108 Id. at 15-16.
109 Id. at 16.
11o Id. at 16-17.
111 I at 17.
112 Id. at 17-18; see also FRANmrJ. TIu, NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON WOMEsN'S EDUC.
PROGRAMS, SExuAL HARAssMENT:. A REPORT ON THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS 26
(1980) (concluding that victims tend to try to cope with incidents of sexual harassment on
their own, no matter how severe the harassment, by employing tactics such as rejection,
'avoidance," "dressing down," submitting to advances, and "ignoring the incidents");
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While Johnathan's" 3 and De'Andre's stories 1 4 raised doubt as to
the seriousness of sexual harassment in America's schools, one must
understand the incidents in the context of the very real and sobering
problems that schools are facing. The AAUW Survey clearly demon-
strates that both female and male students experience sexual harass-
ment starting at a young age." 5 The harassment takes on many
different forms, and fellow classmates are most often the perpetrators.
Although sexual harassment negatively impacts the educational envi-
ronment in a multitude of ways for all students, young girls suffer the
most. More studies will surely follow the media frenzy over recent
high profile cases; however, the courts and schools cannot postpone
dealing with this issue directly, for the future potential of young stu-
dents across the country hangs in the balance.
II
THE COURTS IN CoNFLicT
By allowing plaintiffs to recover monetary damages for inten-
tional violations of Title IX, 116 the Franklin decision dramatically in-
creased "the number of Title IX suits brought by employees and
students alleging that their educational institutions subjected them to
sexual discrimination." 1' 7 While Franklin clearly demonstrates that
"sexual harassment (in all of its forms) is sex discrimination prohib-
ited by Title IX,"" 8 a much disputed issue is "whether, and under
what circumstances," courts should impose Title IX liability on school
districts in cases of peer sexual harassment, that is, when one student
sexually harasses another, creating a hostile educational environ-
Larkin, supra note 15, at 274 (stating that "young women adopted a number of strategies in
an effort to reduce their exposure to harassing behavi[or]").
113 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 92-112.
116 According to one report, while Franklin stands for the proposition that students
sexually harassed by teachers are entitled to collect money damages from their schools and
school officials, the reality of the situation is that no victim has yet collected a penny. See
Richard Carelli, Sex Law: Standards Too High, ORANGE Courvy REGISTrR, Aug. 23, 1997, at
A17; see, e.g., Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the
imposition of strict liability on a school district under Title IX for teacher-student sexual
abuse, and reversing a federal jury verdict of $1.4 million for an eight year-old student who
had been molested by her second-grade health class teacher), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2434
(1997). " 'Suing for monetary damages has been made an empty gesture.'" Carelli, supra,
at A17 (quoting Terry Weldon, the lawyer for the Canutillo plaintiffs). However, "mone-
tary damages have been awarded to students in Title IX cases involving sexual discrimina-
tion other than harassment." Carelli, supra, at A17.
117 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91
F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd en bane, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
118 Gail Sorenson, Employee Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Students in Schools: Recent
Developments in Federal Law, 97 EDUC. L. REP. 997, 998 (1995).
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ment."19 The disagreement between jurisdictions is stark, and there is
no consensus about what standard of liability, if any, should apply.120
The federal courts have developed three conflicting approaches
to this problem. The first approach, which the Ninth, Fourth, and
Tenth Circuits and many district courts have adopted, borrows from
Title VII's standard of liability for employers. This approach applies
the Title VII standard to educational institutions and imposes liability
in cases where schools knew or should have known about the peer
sexual harassment.' 21 The second approach, which the Fifth Circuit
advocates, employs an "equal protection" test, imposing liability only
when a school responded to sexual harassment claims differently
based on sex.122 The third approach, which currently only the Elev-
enth Circuit applies, refuses to find schools liable for peer sexual har-
assment under Title IX under any circumstances. 23
A. Borrowing the Title VII "Employment" Standard
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' 24 the Supreme Court held that
"a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that dis-
crimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work envi-
ronment."125 To raise an actionable claim for hostile or abusive work
environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must allege and prove
that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she
experienced "unwelcomed sexual harassment"; (3) the plaintiff would
not have experienced the harassment but for his or her gender; (4)
the sexual harassment was so pervasive that it "alter[ed] the condi-
tions of employment and creat[ed] an abusive working environment";
and (5) "the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.' 26 In the ab-
sence of Supreme Court precedent or legislative guidelines specifi-
cally addressing peer sexual harassment in the educational context,
119 See Tukel, supra note 66, at 1154.
120 See id. at 1156; see also Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.Sd 463, 468 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that "courts that have discussed the standard of liability for school districts
under Title IX have failed to reach a consensus regarding the appropriate standard").
121 See infra Part H1A.
122 See infra Part II.B.
123 See infra Part l.C.
124 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
125 Id. at 66; see also id. at 65 (noting "a substantial body ofjudicial decisions and EEOC
precedent holding that Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult"). The federal courts first recog-
nized a hostile work environment as violating Title VII when an employer creates or con-
dones a workplace "which significantly and adversely affects an employee because of his
race or ethnicity." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982).
126 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05 (citations omitted); see also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring similar elements for a prima facie cause of
action).
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"several courts have referred to Title VII's employment provisions in
deciding Title IX educational cases and have adopted at least some of
the elements of workplace sexual harassment claims."1 2 7
127 Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VY and Title VII: Happy Together as a Resolution to Title IX Peer
Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 699, 703 (1995). For examples of courts
applying Title VII principles in Title IX sexual discrimination cases involving student-to-
student hostile environment sexual harassment, see Doe v. University of Ill., Nos. 96-3511,
96-4148, 1998 WL 88341, at *13, *16 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998) (finding that Title VII cases
are helpful in addressing Title IX claims of peer sexual discrimination, and holding that
schools are liable under Title IX for failing to respond "promptly and appropriately" to
known peer sexual harassment); Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., No. 95-402-SD, 1997
WL 832794, at *8 (D.N.H. Aug. 25, 1997) (holding that "the duty of a school to its students
should correlate with that of an employer to its employees," and applying the "knew-or-
should-have-known standard" because to hold otherwise would be to give students "less
protection from sexual harassment than . . . employees in the workplace"); Doe v.
Londonberry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997) (rejecting the argument that
.peer sexual harassment is never actionable against a school district under Title IX," but
holding that the plaintiff must show, inter alia, that "the school district knew of the harass-
ment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action"); Nicole M. v. Martinez Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1375-77 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing with approval the use of
Title VII agency principles in holding that "a plaintiff may maintain a Title IX action for
damages against a school district when the plaintiff alleges that the school district knew or
should have known... [of] the plaintiff['s] sexual harass[ment] by other students and the
school district failed to take steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment"); Collier v.
William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that "Title
VII is 'the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards'" and,
therefore, under Title IX, a school district can be held liable "for its failure to prevent or
eradicate a sexually hostile environment created by students, as that environment discrimi-
nates and limits educational opportunities based on sex") (citation omitted); Franks v. Ken-
tucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 746-47 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (equating "sexual
harassment/hostile environment in an educational setting with sexual harassment/hostile
environment in the workplace," and borrowing the elements of a Title VII hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim); Burrow v. Postille Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp.
1193, 1204-05 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (concluding that Franklin's utilization of Title VII case law
to interpret Title IX "strongly indicates that Title VII precedent is appropriate for analysis
of hostile environment sexual harassment claims under Title IX," and finding that plaintiff
stated a proper Title IX claim for damages for her school's "knowing failure to take appro-
priate remedial action in response to the hostile sexual environment created by students");
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (agreeing with
cited authority that "Title VII is the most useful and appropriate analogue in Title IX
cases" that students bring); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1021-23
(W.D. Mo. 1995) (concluding that "the same rule as when an employer is held liable for a
sexually hostile work environment under Title VII must apply when a school district has
knowledge of a sexually hostile school environment and takes no action," and utilizing
Title VII principles and standards to enforce Title IX's prohibition on sex discrimination);
cases cited infra Parts IIA.1-3.
For similar examples of courts utilizing Title VII principles in cases involving teachers
and other employees of educational institutions that have sexually harassed students, see
Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that liability for a profes-
sor's conduct should be determined under the same standard that applies to hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims arising under Title VII); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103
F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "a 'hostile environment' sexual harassment
claim is cognizable under Title IX," and that Title VII principles guide the resolution of
such a claim); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1996)
(equating a school's duty to prevent harassment under Title IX to that of an employer
under Title VII, and finding same-sex harassment actionable under Title IX); Preston v.
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1. Oona, R.-S.- v. McCaffrey 28
In Oona, the Ninth Circuit analogized Title IX to Title VII, and
held that school officials have a duty under Title IX to take reasonable
steps to prevent peer sexual harassment.129 In this case, the plaintiffs,
an 11-year-old sixth-grade student and her parents, brought two sex-
ual harassment claims against the school district and various school
employees.' 3 0 First, the plaintiffs alleged that school officials failed to
take appropriate measures to prevent a student teacher from engag-
ing in a "pattern and practice" of sexual harassment and assault
against Oona and other female students.131 Second, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the school failed to prevent male students from sexually
harassing Oona and other girls, thereby creating a hostile environ-
ment for the female students.'3 2 The boys' conduct, which often oc-
curred within earshot of school employees, involved "loud and vulgar
comments of a sexual nature," repeated references to girls' body parts
as "melons" and "beavers," and calling Oona a "ho" [vulgar slang for
"whore"] and a "lesbian."1 33 After Oona complained, one boy report-
edly struck her in the face and told her to "[glet used to it."1 34 In
Commonwealth of Va. =. reL New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir.
1994) (noting that Title Vii standards and judicial precedent "provide a persuasive body of
standards to which we may look in shaping the contours of a private right of action under
Title IX"); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that Title VII
standards apply to employee-related Title IX claims); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community
Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Because Title VII
prohibits the identical conduct prohibited by Title IX .... we regard it as the most appro-
priate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards.. . ."). But see Rosa H. v.
San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1997) (refusing to "take liberties
with statutory language or with the reasoning of the Supreme Court" and finding that
"Franklin's single citation to Meritor Savings to support the Court's conclusion that sexual
harassment is sex discrimination does not by itselfjustify the importation of other aspects
of Title VII law into the Title IX context"); see cases cited infra Parts 11A1-3.
128 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
129 Id. at 1209-10.
130 See Oona K.-S.- v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D. Cal. 1995),
affld sub noam. Oona R.-S.- v. McCaffrey 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
131 Id. at 1455-56. The conduct on the part of the student teacher included "staring at,
winking at, whispering to, hugging, and otherwise inappropriately touching female stu-
dents," some of which occurred in front of Oona's teacher and the school's principal. I&
at 1456. On one occasion, the student teacher "approached Oona on the playground and
fondled [her] buttocks while whispering ... in her ear." Id. Oona's parents complained to
Oona's teacher, the principal, and the director of Elementary Education, asking the school
to immediately remove the student teacher from her classroom. See id. at 1456-57. Several
other girls also reported that the teacher had acted inappropriately toward them. See id. at
1456. The school removed the student teacher from his position, though he later visited
school grounds during school hours without authorization. See id. at 1456-57.
132 See id. at 1456.
133 Id. at 1457.
134 Id. Plaintiff also alleged that her complaints motivated the defendant school
teacher to commit various acts of retaliation including dropping Oona's grade in her writ-
ing class, refusing to allow her to stay after class with another student to work on the school
newsletter, canceling a school play in which Oona was to perform, failing to properly disci-
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October 1993, the Office for Civil Rights made "a tentative finding
that student-to-student harassment had occurred in [Oona's] class,
that this harassment had created a hostile environment for Oona, and
that officials at the school knew or should have known of the harass-
ment but failed to take timely, effective action to prevent it from con-
tinuing."'3 5 The plaintiffs filed suit against the school district and
individual employees under numerous theories, including violations
of the rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause, 36 the Due Pro-
cess Clause,' 37 42 U.S.C. § 1983,138 and Title IX.139
Finding "that the right created by Title IX may be violated when
female students are subjected to sexual harassment by their male
peers at school," and that "school officials discriminate against the fe-
male students on the basis of sex in encouraging or failing to appro-
priately respond to such harassment," 40 the district court held that
the plaintiffs stated a viable cause of action under Tide IX based on
the peer sexual harassment that Oona suffered.' 4' The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that Title IX clearly imposed a duty on school offi-
cials to prevent peer sexual harassment of its students.' 42 The Oona
court based its holding on the analogy that the Supreme Court drew
between Title VII and Title IX in Franklin, "when it likened the duties
of a school district to prevent sexual harassment under Title IX, to the
Title VII duties of an employer."143 In Franklin, the Supreme Court
incorporated its rationale from Meritor, the leading case recognizing
that an employer can be held liable for hostile-work environment sex-
pline the male student who slapped her, and throwing away Oona's "Young Writers
Award." See id. at 1457-58.
135 Id. at 1458.
136 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
137 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
139 See Oona, 890 F. Supp. at 1458.
140 Id. at 1469. The court went on to say that such discrimination by schools may
evidence itself in many different forms, such as the "active encouragement of peer harass-
ment, the toleration of the harassing behavior of male students, or the failure to take
adequate steps to deter or punish peer harassment." Id. The district court based its con-
clusions on the holding in another peer sexual harassment case in the same district and on
strong implications found in dicta of a Ninth Circuit case. See Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch.
Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Given the extremely harmful effects [peer]
sexual harassment can have on young female students, public officials have an especially
compelling duty not to tolerate it in the classrooms and hallways of our schools.") (cita-
tions omitted); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1575 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
("Surely [a student] is 'denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under' an
education program on the basis of sex when, as alleged here, she is driven to quit an
education program because of the severity of the sexual harassment she is forced to en-
dure in the program.") (quoting Title IX).
141 Oona, 890 F. Supp. at 1469.
142 Oona, R.-S.- v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1997).
143 Id. at 1209 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)); see
also supra text accompanying note 80 (discussing the Franklin Court's analogy).
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ual harassment. 44 The Oona court concluded that "[bly citing [Mer-
itor] with approval in the Title IX context, to define the critical
concept of discrimination on the basis of sex, the Supreme Court in
Franklin was analogizing the duties of school officials to prevent sexual
harassment under Title IX, to those of employers under Title VII.' u 4 5
Therefore, peer sexual harassment that creates a hostile educational
environment is clearly actionable under Tide IX, just as similar harass-
ment that creates a hostile work environment is actionable under Title
VII.14 6 Consequently, the court concluded that schools have the duty
to take reasonable steps to prevent exactly the incidents of peer sexual
harassment that Oona alleged in her complaint. 47
2. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University148
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Brzonkala is the most recent case
to apply Title VII standards to determine school liability for hostile
environment peer sexual harassment under Title IX. In Brzonkala,
two members of the university football team repeatedly raped the
plaintiff, a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute ("Virginia
Tech").149 As the basis of her Title IX complaint, Brzonkala alleged
"that the university knew of the brutal attacks she received and yet
failed to take any meaningful action to punish her offenders or pro-
tect her, but instead permitted a sexually hostile environment to flour-
ish."15 0 Specifically, she complained that with regard to the one
144 See Oona, 122 F.3d at 1210; see also supra text accompanying notes 124-26 (discussing
Meitot).
145 Oona, 122 F.3d at 1210.
146 See id.
147 Id. The court stressed that the issue before it-whether or not schools had a
duty-was narrow, and expressly did not consider "what steps school officials may reason-
ably be required to take to prevent harassment by fellow students .... [or] the extent to
which such action may differ from the action reasonably expected of employers to prevent
harassment by fellow employees." Id. at 1211.
148 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and reh'g en bane granted (Feb. 5, 1998).
149 See id. at 953. The football players forcibly raped Brzonkala three times without a
condom, pinning her arms down and using their knees to force her legs open, and warn-
ing her that "'[she] better not have any fucking diseases.'" Id. As a result of the assault,
Brzonkala became depressed, avoided her classmates, and stopped going to class. See id.
She later tried to commit suicide and was forced to retroactively withdraw from the univer-
sity for the academic year. See id.
150 Id. Seven months after the attack, Brzonkala filed a complaint against her attackers
under the university's Sexual Assault Policy, which the school had released a year earlier,
but had not made widely available to students. See id. at 953-54. She did not pursue crimi-
nal charges against her attackers, thinking it was impossible due to the fact that she did not
save any physical evidence of the rape. See id. at 954.
After the first hearing on the complaint, the judicial committee found one of the
athletes guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. See id. His initial
appeal on due process and arbitrariness grounds was rejected. See id. This decision up-
holding the suspension was final under Virginia Tech's published rules; however, after the
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football player who admitted to having forced sexual intercourse with
her after she told him "no" twice, university officials imposed a "de-
ferred suspension" until graduation, allowing him to return to school
the next fall on a full athletic scholarship. 151
The district court dismissed Brzonkala's complaint for failure to
state a Title IX claim under either a hostile environment or disparate
treatment theory.152 The Fourth Circuit reversed. 153 In addressing
the Title IX hostile environment claim, the court noted that the issue
was a matter of first impression and concluded it "must look to the
extensive jurisprudence developed in the Title VII context ... and the
many cases adopting Tide VII analysis in a Title IX hostile environ-
ment context" for guidance. 54 The court rejected the Fifth Circuit's
"deeply flawed analysis" in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School Dis-
trict'55 as incorrectly framing the issue in terms of institutional liability
for the acts of third parties.156
[I]n a Title IX hostile environment action a plaintiff is not seeking
to hold the school responsible for the acts of third parties (in this
case fellow students). Rather, the plaintiff is seeking to hold the
school responsible for its own actions, i.e. that the school "knew or
should have known of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt
and adequate remedial action."' 57
In this vein, the court reasoned, Brzonkala was not seeking to hold
Virginia Tech liable for the acts of her classmates, but "for its own dis-
criminatory actions in failing to remedy a known hostile environ-
ment."' 58 This is exactly the type of discriminatory conduct for which
Title IX imposes liability on educational institutions. 159
athlete hired an attorney, the university decided to rehear the complaint. See id. After the
rehearing, the judicial committee again found the athlete guilty of abusive conduct and
imposed the same sanction. See id. at 955. The student again appealed, and the Senior
Vice-President and Provost overturned his suspension, concluding that the punishment of
immediate suspension for one year was excessive compared to "other cases," and imposing
a "deferred suspension until... graduation." Id.
151 Id. at 955. Brzonkala did not learn that the university had set aside the suspension
from school officials, but rather from the Washington Post. See id. She canceled her own
plans to return to the university, fearing "for her safety because of previous threats and
Virginia Tech's treatment of [her attacker]." Id. According to Brzonkala, the university's
actions communicated to the violator, "as well as the student body as a whole, that the
school either did not believe her or did not view [the] conduct as improper." Id.
152 Id. at 956.
153 Id. at 953.
'54 Id. at 957.
155 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
156 Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 958.
157 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d
258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996).
158 I1&
159 Id.
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The court then turned to Tide VII principles to determine the
boundaries of Brzonkala's hostile environment claim.160 It held that
under Title IX a plaintiff asserting a hostile environment claim must
show: "1) that she [or he] belongs to a protected group; 2) that she
[or he] was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; 3) that the
harassment was based on sex; 4) that the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her [or his] edu-
cation and create an abusive educational environment; and 5) that
some basis for institutional liability has been established."16'
With respect to the fourth element, the court found that a sole inci-
dent of rape or sexual assault is in itself "plainly sufficient to state a
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment."'1 2 In this case,
given the extreme seriousness of the harassment involved, in conjunc-
tion with Virginia Tech's awareness of the situation, its failure to effec-
tively remedy the hostile environment, and Brzonkala's fear of
retaliation, Brzonkala alleged facts sufficient to satisfy this element,
even though she did not return to school the next year. 163 The court
again looked to Tide VII precedent to resolve the issue of institutional
liability, and held that a Tide IX plaintiff must prove that the school
"'knew or should have known of the illegal conduct and failed to take
prompt and adequate remedial action."''164 Because the university
clearly knew about the rapes after Brzonkala filed her complaint, the
issue was "whether Virginia Tech took prompt and adequate remedial
action once it was on notice."165 The court concluded that Brzonkala
alleged numerous facts that "if proven, would allow ajury to find that
Virginia Tech's response to Brzonkala's gang rape was neither prompt
nor adequate.' 66
160 Id.
161 Id. (alterations in original) (citing several Title IX hostile environment cases imple-
menting Title VII analysis).
162 Id. at 959 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
163 See id. at 959-60.
164 Id. at 960 (quoting Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th
Cir. 1996)).
165 Id. (citing Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F,2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part
on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)).
166 Id. at 961. These facts included Virginia Tech's toleration of
an environment in which male student athletes' could gang rape a female
student without any significant punishment to the male attackers, nor any
real assistance to the female victim[, and] a legion of procedural irregulari-
ties in the hearing process, Virginia Tech's disregard for its own rules of
finality, and its eventual decision to impose virtually no penalty for an ad-
mitted rape.
Id. at 960-61.
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3. Seamons v. Snow 167
Seamons is thus far the only Title IX suit for student-to-student
sexual harassment brought by a male student. 168 Seamons alleged
that five football teammates grabbed him in the high school locker
room while he was naked, tied him with tape to a towel rack, taped his
genital area, and brought in a girl he once dated to look at him, all in
the presence of other team members.' 69 After Seamons reported the
incident to various school officials, his football coach demanded in
front of the entire football team that he apologize for complaining to
the school administration and betraying the team. 170 Upon Seamon's
refusal to apologize, the coach dismissed him from the team. 171 The
only action that the school district took was to cancel the last football
game of the season, a state playoff garne. 72
While he did not file suit for the initial assault, Seamons did sue
based on the school's conduct, alleging that its response to the assault
was "sexually discriminatory and harassing," because officials expected
him to "have taken it like a man," and the coach dismissed the inci-
dent as "boys will be boys."1 73 Furthermore, Seamons alleged that he
was subjected to a hostile environment as a result of his classmates'
retaliatory threats and harassment and the principal's suggestion that
he leave the high school.' 74
The district court dismissed Seamon's Title IX claim on a motion
for summaryjudgment. 175 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.176 According
to the court,
[t] o state a cause of action under Tide IX, a plaintiff must show: (1)
that he or she was excluded from participation in, denied the bene-
fits of, or subjected to discrimination in an educational program;
167 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
168 See Thomas R. Baker, Sexual Misconduct Among Students: Title IX Court Decisions in the
Aftermath of Franklin v. Gwinnett County, 109 ED. LAW REP. 519, 522 (1996).
169 See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1230.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 Id.
174 See id. Eventually, Seamons chose to leave the school and enroll in a distant county.
See id. In addition to filing a Title IX claim, Seamons filed a § 1983 cause of action alleging
a violation of "[his] constitutional rights to. . . due process, freedom of association, free-
dom of speech, familial association, and... equal protection." Id.
175 See id. at 1230-31. The district court noted that a plaintiff must prove discrimina-
tory intent under Title IX, and held that Seamons "failed, as a matter of law, to allege
sufficient facts to support his claim that [d]efendants were motivated by an intent to dis-
criminate against him on the basis of his sex." Id. The court refused to apply Title VII
principles of hostile environment sexual harassment doctrine because of "important dis-
tinctions" between Title VII and Title IX. See id at 1231.
176 Id. at 1233.
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(2) that the program receives federal assistance; and (3) that the
exclusion from the program was on the basis of sex. 177
To determine whether such exclusion was based on sex, the court im-
plemented the five-pronged test for hostile work environment sexual
harassment, 78 and concluded that the plaintiff did not allege facts
sufficient to show discrimination on the basis of sex.179 The court
found that although the school district might have created and toler-
ated a hostile educational environment, it was not the type of "sexually
charged hostile environment cognizable as sexual harassment." 80
Therefore, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the third prong of the test, that
the harassment was based on sex, because the facts were not "suffi-
cient to indicate that the conduct being challenged (which it must be
remembered, post dates the locker room assault) was 'sexual' in na-
ture, as defined in the hostile environment context."' 81 Because of
the failure to allege sexual discrimination, the court did not reach the
issue of school liability for the conduct of its students.182 Although
the court only reached the third element of its test, thus avoiding the
tougher question of school liability, Seamons is significant because of
its recognition of hostile environment peer sexual harassment as a Ti-
te IX cause of action, its approval of the utilization of Title VII stan-
dards to resolve this issue, and because it thus far represents the lone
Title IX case brought by a male student.
B. The "Equal Protection" Test: Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent
School District183
The Fifth Circuit held in Rowinshy that Title IX does not impose
liability on a school district for peer hostile environment sexual har-
assment, absent allegations that the school district "responded to sex-
177 Id. at 1232 (citing Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 143-44
(W.D. Pa.), affd, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989)).
178 See id. The five elements a plaintiff must successively prove are:
(1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he was subject to
unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that
the sexual harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as unreasona-
bly to alter the conditions of his education and [to] create an abusive edu-
cational environment; and (5) that some basis for institutional liability has
been established.
Id. (citingDavis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91
F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd en banG 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843)).
179 Id. at 1232-33.
180 Id at 1232.
181 Id. at 1233. The definition of hostile environment sexual harassment includes "sub-
ject[ion] to unwelcomed sexual advances or requests for sexual favors," or "us[ing] sex to
contribute to a hostile environment." Id.
182 See id. at 1232 n.7.
183 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
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ual harassment claims differently based on sex."'18 4 The court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit on a motion for sum-
mary judgment for failure to state a claim under Title IX.' 85
The plaintiffs in Rowinsky, two eighth grade sisters, rode a public
school bus to and from school on a daily basis.18 6 On the bus, a male
student repeatedly verbally and physically harassed the two girls.'8 7
This male student swatted their bottoms when they walked down the
aisle, made comments such as, "When are you going to let me fuck
you?," and "What size panties are you wearing?,' u8 8 and groped one
girl's genital area.'8 9 The sisters complained at least eight times about
the boy's conduct to the bus driver, and the girls' parents reported the
problem to the school principal, who admitted that another student
had already informed him of the incidents in question. 90 The school
suspended the male student from riding the bus for three days, and
forced him to sit in the row behind the driver.' 9 ' However, even after
his suspension, the remarks and misbehavior continued.1 92 Later that
year, a second male student on the bus, in two separate incidents,
groped at the girls' genital areas and made crude remarks about the
areas he was touching.' 93 He was suspended from school for three
days. 194 A third male student, this time in the classroom, placed his
hand under one girl's shirt and unhooked her bra.195 He was sus-
pended for the remainder of that day and the next. 96 The girls'
mother complained to various school officials about their failure to
take appropriate action, and reported that other girls were also suffer-
ing from sexual harassment. 97 She later sued the school district on
behalf of her daughters, alleging that the district and its employees
"condoned and caused hostile environment sexual harassment."' 98
184 Id. at 1016. For an example of such an allegation involving peer sexual orientation
harassment, see Carol Ness, Pacifica Schools Hit with Harassment Suit: Boy Says District Didn't
Protect Him from Anti-Gay Slurs, S.F. ExamINER, Aug. 12, 1996, at A3 (reporting a male stu-
dent's allegations that the "'school district had enforced policies and procedures to pre-
vent sexual harassment, discrimination and violence against girls, yet refused to enforce
the policies with respect to [this particular male s]tudent'" and the anti-gay slurs he
endured).
185 Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008.
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 Id.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See idL at 1009.
'94 See id
195 See id,
196 See id&
197 See id.
198 Id. at 1010.
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The district court dismissed the plaintiff's Title IX claim, conclud-
ing that "there was no evidence that [the school district] had discrimi-
nated against students on the basis of sex" and that "Rowinsky had
failed to provide evidence that sexual harassment and misconduct
[were] treated less severely toward girls than toward boys."' 99 The
Fifth Circuit agreed. In rejecting the argument that Title IX extends
to the discriminatory acts of third parties, the court interpreted the
statute to impose liability only for the acts of grant recipients.200
Therefore, in determining school liability under Title IX and whether
the acts of the school, as a grant recipient, constitute discrimination
on the basis of sex for student-to-student sexual harassment, a plaintiff
must prove that the school intentionally discriminated against stu-
dents on the basis of sex.20 1 In the case of peer sexual harassment, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that
the school district responded to sexual harassment claims differ-
ently based on sex. Thus, a school district might violate [T] ide IX if
it treat[ed] sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual
harassment of girls, or even if it turn[ed] a blind eye toward sexual
harassment of girls while addressing assaults that harmed boys. 20 2
The majority found the Title VII discrimination theory dealing
with the adult employment situation inapplicable to a situation involv-
199 Id. The district court relied on the fact that boys who harassed boys were treated
the same as boys who harassed girls and that "any failure to train [school] employees would
harm male and female victims of harassment equally." Id.
200 Id. at 1012. Judge Smith reasoned that "[i]mposing liability for the acts of third
parties would be incompatible with the purpose of a spending condition, because grant
recipients have little control over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably
violate the prohibitions of [T]itle IX." Id. at 1013. The court relied on three factors to
conclude that courts must interpret Title IX to impose liability only for the acts of the
school itself. the scope and structure of the statute; the legislative history; and agency inter-
pretation of the statue. See id. at 1012-16.
201 See id. at 1016. A few district courts that have addressed claims for peer sexual
harassment under Title IX have, like Rowinsky, required proof of intentional discrimina-
tion on the part of the school district in order to establish such a claim; however, unlike
Rowinsky, these courts have allowed the trier of fact to infer such intent from the totality of
proof, including evidence of the school's failure to prevent or stop the harassment despite
actual knowledge, the school's toleration of the harassing behavior, and the persuasiveness
or severity of the harassment. See Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020
(W.D. Mo. 1995) (stating that discriminatory intent does not "require proof that unlawful
discrimination is the sole purpose behind each act of the defendant being scrutinized," but
rather that the plaintiff may rely upon "'the cumulative evidence of action and inaction
which objectively manifests discriminatory intent'") (citing Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698
F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983)); Oona R-.S.-v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452,
1469 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that discriminatory intent on the part of the school "may
manifest itself in the active encouragement of peer harassment, the toleration of the
harassing behavior of male students, or the failure to take adequate steps to deter or pun-
ish peer harassment"), aft'd sub nom. Oona K--S.- v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir.
1997).
202 Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016.
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ing school children.20 3 In support of this conclusion, the court noted
that "[u] nwanted sexual advances of fellow students do not carry the
same coercive effect or abuse of power as those made by a teacher,
employer or co-worker. '20 4 The court defined sexual harassment as
"'the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of [a
relationship of] unequal power,"' 20 5 demonstrating that the court
viewed the power relationship in the educational setting as between
the educational institution and the student-not between students.20 6
According to the court, in the situation of student-to-student sexual
harassment, the key ingredient of power is missing between harasser
and victim. 20 7 For this reason, the court found the importation of
Title VII standards from the employment context to be inappropriate.
Judge Dennis wrote a vigorous dissent in Rowinsky, maintaining
that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim for relief under Title IX and
were therefore entitled to a trial 20 8 For Judge Dennis, the Supreme
Court's decision in Franklin meant not only that money damages were
available under a private right of action based on Title IX, but also
that
an educational institution receiving federal funds intentionally vio-
lates Title IX and engages in sex discrimination against which the
statute affords protection when it knowingly fails to take reasonable
steps within its power to prevent the sexual harassment or abuse of a
student by a teacher that is so severe or pervasive that it creates a
hostile and harmful school atmosphere for that student.209
Furthermore, Judge Dennis argued that the Supreme Court's citation
of Meritor Savings Bank in Franklin indicated that it considered Title
VII standards "appropriate criteria for determining when there has
been a violation of Title IX giving rise to a claim of 'hostile environ-
ment' sex discrimination."210 Most importantly, Judge Dennis as-
203 Id. at 1011 & n.11. The majority explicitly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's
initial ruling in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996),
vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (1997), criticizing its
.statutory construction and selective use of legislative history." Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010
n.8. The court could not find any other federal court of appeals that had held a school
liable for student-to-student sexual harassment. See id
204 Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011 n.11.
205 Id. (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SxUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1
(1979)).
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 Id. at 1016-17 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 1020 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
210 Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, coworker sexual harassment
is actionable under Title VII based on "the employer's failure to take reasonable corrective
measures" after notification of the harassment, if such harassment is " 'sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment.'" Id. (citations omitted) (Dennis, J., dissenting). In this case, the plaintiff
alleged that the school failed to take the necessary steps to remedy peer sexual harassment
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serted that the school board "owes a much higher duty to its students
and has far greater powers of control over them than that described in
the majority opinion."211
C. No Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment Under Title IX:
Davis v. Monroe County Board of EducationP2
In a surprising and divided opinion, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting
en banc, recently reversed an Eleventh Circuit panel in holding that
Title IX does not support a claim for a school official's failure to pre-
vent student-to-student sexual harassment.213 The plaintiff in Davis al-
leged that a fifth-grade male student continually sexually harassed her
daughter, LaShonda.214 The male student, over a six-month period,
repeatedly attempted to fondle LaShonda's breasts and genitals,
rubbed against her in a sexual manner, and made offensive sexual
remarks to her.2 1 5 LaShonda's mother also alleged that the school
"knew of the harassment yet failed to take any meaningful action to
stop it and protect her [daughter]."216 Specifically, LaShonda and
her mother reported the incidents of sexual harassment to her teach-
ers and the principal, yet requests for protection from the male stu-
dent went unanswered, and "[s]chool officials never removed or
disciplined [him] in any manner for his sexual harassment of
LaShonda."21 7 A teacher even refused LaShonda's initial requests to
move from her assigned seat which was next to the harassing stu-
dent.2 1 8 The plaintiff further alleged that as a result of the ongoing
sexual harassment and the school's failure to act on it, LaShonda's
ability to take advantage of her education was severely hampered, her
concentration and grades suffered, and her mental and emotional
health deteriorated.21 9 The harassment finally ended only after
and abuse "sufficiently severe and pervasive as to create ... a hostile and offensive educa-
tional environment," despite actual knowledge of the harassment. Id. at 1024 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting). ForJudge Dennis, this failure constituted a violation of Title IX's requirement
that a school "take appropriate measures to protect students from being subjected in the
school environment to sexual harassment, abuse and discrimination of which the [school]
... has actual knowledge." Id. at 1025 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 1024 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
212 120 F.3d 1390 (1lth Cir.) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S.
Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
213 See id. at 1392.
214 SeeDavis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186,1188-89 (l1th Cir.), vacated,
91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd en ban4 120 F.3d 1390 (l1th Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843). The offensive language included
remarks like "I want to get in bed with you," and "I want to feel your boobs." Id. at 1189.
215 See id. at 1188.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1189.
218 See id.
219 See id. The harassment even led LaShonda to write a suicide note. See id.
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LaShonda's mother filed criminal charges of sexual battery against
the boy, to which he pled guilty.220
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs Title IX claim against
the school board.221 On appeal from the summaryjudgment dismis-
sal, a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Title
IX prohibits peer hostile environment sexual harassment and requires
schools to take steps to remedy it when they know, or should know,
that it is occurring.222 Noting that courts have relied on Title VII stan-
dards to prohibit a teacher's quid pro quo2 23 and hostile environment
sexual harassment of a student,224 and that the Supreme Court relied
on Title VII principles in a Title IX case,225 the court concluded that it
was appropriate to apply Title VII principles to LaShonda's case.
226
The court held that
220 See id&
221 See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga.
1994), afj'd sub nom. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843). The dis-
trict court concluded that
[t]he sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not part of a
school program or activity. Plaintiff does not allege that the Board or an
employee of the Board had any role in the harassment. Thus, any harm to
LaShonda was not proximately caused by a federally-funded educational
provider.
Id.
222 Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193-95. The Eleventh Circuit's initial Davis opinion was the first
by a circuit court to directly address the issue of school liability for peer sexual harassment
See Tukel, supra note 66, at 1154. This decision became the leading case in the area of
student-to-student sexual harassment, and several district courts have followed this reason-
ing. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Does v.
Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 567-68 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Burrow v.
Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205-06 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
223 See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190-91 (citing Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.
Conn. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980)). The court in Alexander observed that
it is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement condi-
tioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination
in education, just as questions ofjob retention or promotion tied to sexual
demands from supervisors have become increasingly recognized as poten-
tial violations of Title VII's ban against sex discrimination in employment.
Alexander, 459 F. Supp. at 4.
224 See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1191 (citing Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp.
1360, 1366 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affid, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986)). The court in Moire
observed that "[t]hough the sexual harassment 'doctrine' has generally developed in the
context of Tide VII, these [Title VII] guidelines seem equally applicable to Title IX."
Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1366 n.2.
225 See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1191 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 74-75 (1992)). The court acknowledged that several courts have understood the
Supreme Court's decision in Franklin as indicating that "'in a Title IX suit for gender
discrimination based on sexual harassment of a student, an educational institution may be
held liable under standards similar to those applied in cases under Title VII.'" d. (quoting
Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) and citing
Doe v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
226 See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193.
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as Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hos-
tile working environment created by co-workers and tolerated by
the employer, Title IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a
sexually hostile educational environment created by a fellow stu-
dent or students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to
act to eliminate the harassment.227
Judge Birch dissented from the Eleventh Circuit's first Davis opinion,
disagreeing with the majority's holding that the plaintiff's allegations
stated a valid claim under Title IX.228
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion was vacated and a rehearing en
banc was granted.229 Upon rehearing, a divided en banc panel af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the Title IX claim, and held that
227 1& Therefore, borrowing from Title VII, when a school knowingly fails to take ac-
tion to remedy a hostile environment that student-to-student sexual harassment has
caused, the harassed student has "'be [en] denied the benefits of, or be[en] subjected to
discrimination under' that educational program in violation of Title IX." Id& at 1194 (alter-
ations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)). The court reasoned that "a fe-
male student should not be required to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to obtain an education." Id. After concluding that Title IX
applied, the court used the five-prong test for employer liability for hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment in this new situation. See id. at 1194-95. It found that LaShonda
sufficiently stated a Title IX claim against the school board for damages based on a sexually
hostile educational environment that a classmate created by alleging- (1) that she was a
member of the protected group of female students; (2) that she was subject to unwelcome
verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) "that the harassment was based on sex";
(4) that the five-month period of harassment altered the conditions of her learning envi-
ronment; and (5) that school officials knew or should have known about the harassment,
but failed to take prompt and corrective action. See id. The court based its finding, in part,
on allegations that the male classmate engaged in sexually abusive conduct, the abuse was
severe enough to support criminal charges, the abuse was "physically threatening and hu-
miliating rather than merely offensive," and that school officials had actual and repeated
knowledge of the harassment, given that LaShonda and her mother reported the abuse to
her teacher and principal on several occasions. Id. at 1195.
A few courts have adopted the first four elements of this test, but modified the fifth
element See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 176-77
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (modifying the fifth element such that plaintiffs could establish "institu-
tional liability" only if the school district had actual knowledge of the harassment and
failed to take appropriate remedial action); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929
F. Supp. 1193, 1205-06 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (articulating a different fifth element for proving
a prima facie case of peer harassment, "that the educational institution knew of the harass-
ment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial measures because of the plaintiff's
sex").
228 See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1195-96 (Birch, J., dissenting). For Judge Birch, this case was
analytically distinct from Franklin, which involved a teacher's sexual harassment and assault
of a student, and in which school officials that knew of the teacher's conduct failed to take
action against him. See id. at 1195 (Birch, J., dissenting). "[Tihe majority ma[de] an un-
precedented extension in holding that Title IX encompasses a claim of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment based on the conduct of a student" Id at 1196 (Birch, J.,
dissenting). Even if the scope of Title IX covered student-to-student sexual harassment,
Judge Birch "would limit that holding to intentional conduct on the part of the school
board," and not extend Title IX to negligent failure to intervene to prevent harassment.
Id. (Birch, J., dissenting).
229 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Title IX does not allow a claim against a school board based on a
school official's failure to remedy a known hostile environment that
student-to-student sexual harassment has created. 230 After an exhaus-
tive examination of Title IX's legislative history, the court noted that
"the drafters of Title IX never discussed student-student sexual harass-
ment or the related issue of school discipline."'231 Finding that Con-
gress enacted Title IX under the Spending Clause of Article I, which
empowers Congress to spend for the general welfare of the United
States, 23 2 the court concluded:
When Congress enacts legislation pursuant to the Spending Clause,
it in effect offers to form a contract with potential recipients of fed-
eral funding....
To ensure the voluntariness of participation in federal pro-
grams, the Supreme Court has required Congress to give potential
recipients unambiguous notice of the conditions they are assuming
when they accept federal funding.233
Based on this analysis, the court held that Title IX only imposes the
duty on educational institutions to "prevent their employees from
themselves engaging in gender discrimination," not a nonemployee
from discriminating against a student.23 4 In reaching this conclusion,
the court explicitly rejected the "invitation to use Title VII standards
of liability to resolve this Title IX case." 235
Four judges sitting on the en banc panel dissented.23 6 According
to the dissent, the majority ignored the plain meaning of Title IX, its
spirit, and its purpose to reach the conclusion that no matter how
flagrant or criminal the harassment may be, and how aware of it the
school might become, there is no duty to take any steps to stop it
"under the very law which was passed to eliminate sexual discrimina-
tion in our public schools." 237 Concluding that Title IX provides a
230 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1401 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
banc). Of the eleven judges, six concurred only in part, and four dissented.
231 Id. at 1397.
232 See id. at 1399.
233 Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
234 Id. at 1401.
235 Id. at 1399-1400 n.13. Although acknowledging the Supreme Court's use of Mefitor
in Franklin, the court found it more significant that "the Supreme Court has never dis-
cussed student-student sexual harassment or generally applied Title VII jurisprudence to
Title IX cases." Id. The court rejected the use of Title VII principles because: (1)
"[i] nterpreting the plain language of different statutes does not automatically produce the
same result simply because both statutes proscribe similar behavior;" (2) "Title VII was
enacted under the far-reaching Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment;" and (3) Tite VII liability relies on "agency principles" that are "useless in discussing
liability for student-student harassment under Title IX, because students are not agents of
the school board." Id.
236 See id. at 1411-19 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 1412 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
1046 [Vol. 83:1014
1998] PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1047
cause of action for peer sexual harassment,238 the dissent would follow
Supreme Court precedent, and use "Title VII principles to delineate
the scope of the school board's duty and identify the elements of a
cause of action under Title IX."23 9
III
ANALYsIS: COURTS SHOULD HOLD SCHOOLS LIABLE UNDER
TrrLE IX FOR PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT WHILE
EMPLOYING A TrrLE VII STANDARD
Title IX should have "a sweep as broad as its language."240 Just as
an employer is liable for sex discrimination and sexual harassment in
the workplace, a school district should be held liable for the same
conduct occurring on its campus.241 In light of the abundance of sex-
ual harassment occurring among students which creates a hostile edu-
cational environment, and its harmful and potentially permanent
consequences, it is essential that courts "place an affirmative duty on
school officials to prevent peer sexual harassment."242 Because of a
lack of Supreme Court precedent addressing peer sexual harassment
in the educational context, it is proper for courts to refer "to Title
VII's employment provisions in deciding Title IX educational cases,"
and to adopt "the elements of Title VII workplace sexual harassment
claims."
2 4 3
238 See id. at 1412-13 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Starting with a plain meaning analysis,
the dissent concluded that liability under Title IX "hinges upon whether the grant recipi-
ent maintained an educational environment that excluded any person from participating,
denied them benefits, or subjected them to discrimination," of which hostile environment
sexual harassment is one form of such discrimination. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992)). Furthermore, "the absolute prohibition contained in the
text is framed solely in terms of who is protected. The identity of the perpetrator is simply
irrelevant under the language .... " Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). The dissent also found
persuasive the fact that the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title IX interprets the
statute "to impose liability on school officials for permitting an educational environment of
severe, persistent, or pervasive peer sexual harassment when they know or should know
about it, and fail to take immediate and appropriate corrective action to remedy it." Id.
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
239 Id. at 1415 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
240 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (citations omitted).
The Court in Bell found that Title IX protected employees of educational institutions. Id.
at 520-35.
241 See LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 90.
242 Miller, supra note 127, at 722.
243 Id. at 703; see id. n.40 (noting that many lower federal courts have already done so).
Some commentators argue that there are even more compelling reasons for imposing lia-
bility on educational institutions for sexual harassment than those compelling employers'
liability in the workplace. See Neera Rellan Stacy, Note, Seeking a SuperiorInstitutional Liabil-
ity Standard Under Title 1Xfor Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1338, 1354
(1996) (citing "six reasons for requiring a stricter standard of liability" for educational
institutions, such as "the function and importance of a discrimination-free learning envi-
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A. Compatibility of Title VII and Title IX
Title VII and Title IX are analogous, consisting of virtually identi-
cal language. 244 Both Tide VII and Tide IX proscribe sexual harass-
ment as a form of discrimination on the basis of sex. 245 Tide IX
generally traces the more fully developed case law of Tide VII. 246
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Franklin demonstrated that "unlike
the Rowinsky court, it does not find use of Tide VII analysis 'problem-
atic' in considering Tide IX issues. ' 247 It specifically relied on a work-
place decision-Meritor-to support its finding that damages could be
recovered in a Tide IX harassment suit. 248 The Court also indicated a
willingness to allow Tide IX hostile environment claims, because the
Franklin plaintiff alleged that a school employee had created an "abu-
sive sexual environment," not that she suffered quid pro quo
harassment.249
Finally, "the Franklin court indicated that the overriding principle
of Tide VII, i.e., the elimination of discriminatory treatment, intimida-
tion and scorn, should extend to Tide IX actions brought by stu-
dents,"250 thus acknowledging that "a student should have the same
protection in school that an employee has in the workplace."251 Sev-
eral federal appellate and district courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead in recognizing the relevance of Tide VII principles to
Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment claims. 252 For exam-
ronment," mandatory attendance laws requiring students to attend elementary through
high school and "the limited protection for students and the lack of incentives for schools
resulting from adoption of Tide VII's knew-or-should-have-known standard"); see also
Strauss, supra note 17, at 181 (arguing that "[e]ducational institutions must be held to a
higher standard" than employers because individual students cannot bring about change
during their short tenure, students have "no where else to go," and school "serves as the
parent and the student's 'home away from home' for seven or more hours of the day").
244 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
245 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
246 See Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311,
316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Because Tide VII prohibits the identical conduct prohibited by
Tide IX, i.e., sex discrimination, we regard it as the most appropriate analogue when defin-
ing Tide IX's substantive standards.... ."); LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 90; supra note 127 and
accompanying text.
247 Tukel, supra note 66, at 1156; see also Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929
F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("The Supreme Court's utilization of its Tide VII
case law to interpret Tide IX in Franklin strongly indicates that Tide VII precedent is appro-
priate for analysis of hostile environment sexual harassment claims under Title IX."); Bos-
ley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995) ("Franklin supports
the conclusion that Tide VII law provides standards for enforcing the anti-discrimination
provisions of Title IX.").
248 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986)).
249 Miller, supra note 127, at 711.
250 Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D. Va. 1995).
251 Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
252 See cases cited supra note 127.
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ple, in Collier by Collier v. William Penn School District, the plaintiff, a
special education student, alleged that male classmates, whose con-
duct included "offensive language, sexual innuendo, sexual proposi-
tions, and threats of physical harm, repeatedly sexually harassed
her."253 In holding that the plaintiff stated a viable cause of action,
the court found that "Tite VII is 'the most appropriate analogue
when defining Title IX's substantive standards.' 2 54
B. Comparing the Work and School Environments
Commentators that oppose the application of Title VII principles
to Title IX cases argue that the adult employment situation is just too
different to import Title VII discrimination theory into a sexual har-
assment situation involving school children.2 55 However, many simi-
larities exist between the employment and school environments that
justify using Title VII principles in Title IX situations.2 56 In either set-
ting, a victim of sexual harassment is denied the benefits of working
or receiving an education in an environment free from discrimina-
tion. Schools have at least as much control over their students as em-
ployers have over their employees. Moreover, a school that does not
intervene when a student sexually harasses another student, like the
employer who remains idle while an employee sexually harasses an-
other employee, thereby imprints its stamp of approval on the
harassment.2 57
To the extent that the workplace and the school yard do differ,
those differences militate in favor of greater protection for stu-
dents.2 58 "The ability to control and influence behavior exists to an
even greater extent in the classroom than in the workplace, as stu-
253 Collier by Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1211 (E.D. Pa.
1997).
254 Id. at 1213 (quoting Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational
Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987)). The court concluded that because "Title
VII imposes liability on employers for their failure to prevent or eradicate a sexually hostile
environment created by employees," a school district should be liable under Title IX "for
its failure to prevent or eradicate a sexually hostile environment created by students, as
that environment discriminates and limits educational opportunities based on sex." Id. (ci-
tations omitted).
255 See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n.11 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
256 See Miller, supra note 127, at 721; see also Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d
137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992) ("There is no meaningful distinction between the work environ-
ment and school environment which would forbid such discrimination in the former and
tolerate it in the latter."), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993).
257 Cf Williams & Brake, supra note 43, at 433 (applying a similar analogy to the situa-
tion where a customer sexually harasses an employee).
258 See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (noting that such differences "serve only to emphasize the need for zealous protec-
tion against sex discrimination in the schools"). JoAnn Strauss argues that schools must be
held to a higher standard than employers because the relationship between a student and
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dents look to their teachers for guidance as well as for protection."259
The Supreme Court has also recognized that schools maintain "a de-
gree of supervision and control [over school children] that could not
be exercised over free adults." 260
Furthermore, the negative ramifications of sexual harassment in
the academic setting may be even more pervasive and permanent than
in the workplace 261 because "the harassment has a greater and longer
lasting impact on its young victims, and institutionalizes sexual harass-
ment as accepted behavior."262 Finally, although it may be economi-
cally difficult for an adult employee to change jobs, "it is virtually
impossible for a child to leave the school to which he or she is as-
signed."263 This discussion of the educational and work environments
demonstrates not only that Title IX peer sexual harassment situations
are amenable to an application of Title VII principles and standards,
but also that policy considerations demand giving students the same
broad-if not broader-protection afforded to employees. 26
C. Final Policy Guidelines of the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Education
The Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education
("OCR")-the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title IX-has
issued its final policy guidelines which apprise educational institutions
of the standards that OCR will use (and that institutions themselves
an educational institution is materially distinct from the employee-employer relationship
in many respects:
[a] student's tenure is of a short length, and any individual student has
little ability to bring about change. Essentially the student has no where
else to go and does not have the option to change jobs to escape from the
hostile environment. The institution serves as the parent and the student's
"home away from home" for seven or more hours of the day, and generally
legislators have adopted protectionist and paternalistic laws to protect those
of school age. Additionally, the student, through the taxpayer, is actively
purchasing an education, and thus, the obligation of the institution is to
provide a learning environment free from distractions such as peer sexual
harassment.
Strauss, supra note 17, at 181 (citations omitted).
259 Id.
260 Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1024 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (analogizing from a prior
Supreme Court case, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), in which the
Court held that a school board may require all participants in high school athletic pro-
grams to submit to urinalysis testing regardless of whether any grounds existed to suspect a
particular athlete).
261 See AAUW SuRvEY, supra note 16, at 15 (listing several adverse consequences of
sexual harassment in schools, such as a desire not to attend school and a greater reluctance
to speak in class).
262 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir.), vacated 91
F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996), reu'd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.), petitionfor cert. fikd, 66
U.SL.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
263 Tukel, supra note 66, at 1157.
264 See id.
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should use) when investigating and resolving hostile environment
claims based on peer sexual harassment.265 In enforcing Title IX,
OCR has discovered
that a significant number of students, both male and female, have
experienced sexual harassment, that sexual harassment can inter-
fere with a student's academic performance and emotional and
physical well-being, and that preventing and remedying sexual har-
assment in schools is essential to ensure nondiscriminatory, safe en-
vironments in which students can learn. 266
The OCR guidelines explicitly state that the Department will apply,
"'as appropriate to the educational context, many of the legal princi-
ples applicable to sexual harassment in the workplace developed
under Title VII."267 Furthermore, the guidelines reference Title VII
cases in establishing and defining OCR's standard of liability.2 68
The OCR takes a position consistent with the Supreme Court case
law that sexual harassment of students in certain circumstances is sex
discrimination under Title IX.2 69 According to the policy guidelines,
such sexual harassment encompasses peer sexual harassment.270 A
school will be liable for peer sexual harassment if "(i) a hostile envi-
ronment exists in the school's programs or activities, (ii) the school
knows or should have known of the harassment, and (iii) the school
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action."2 71 Accord-
ing to the OCR guidelines,
[u]nder these circumstances, a school's failure to respond to the
existence of a hostile environment within its own programs or activi-
ties permits an atmosphere of sexual discrimination to permeate
the educational program and results in discrimination prohibited
by Title IX.... Thus, Tite IX does not make a school responsible
265 See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,034. Agencies' guidelines
on statutes that they are empowered to interpret and enforce are persuasive authority for
the courts and thus are entitled to deference. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982) (noting that the Supreme Court "normally accords great
deference to the interpretation . . . of the agency charged with the statute's
administration").
266 Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,034.
267 Id. at 12,046 n.2.
268 See, e.g., id. at 12,04647 n.6, 12,047 nn.16-17, 12,048 n.36.
269 Id. at 12,038.
270 d. The guidelines define hostile environment sexual harassment as sexually
harassing conduct "by an employee, by another student; or by a third party that is sufficiently
severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from
an education program or activity, or to create a hostile or abusive educational environ-
ment." d. (emphasis added). Sexually harassing conduct can include "unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a
sexual nature." Id. (citation omitted).
271 Id. at 12,039 (citation omitted).
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for the actions of harassing students, but rather for its own discrimi-
nation in failing to remedy it once the school has notice.272
This interpretation of Title IX, holding schools liable for peer sexual
harassment, is consistent with the Department of Education's inter-
pretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which would hold
schools liable for tolerating peer racial harassment.273 The OCR's in-
terpretation is likewise consistent with the interpretation of Title VII
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
maintains, which holds employers liable for hostile environment sex-
ual harassment that co-workers have perpetuated. 274
D. How the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits Miss the Point
1. Rowinsky: The Wrong Standard
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning and adoption of a low standard of
care for schools in RowinskfP75 "is contrary to Franklin, as well as the
letter and spirit of Title IX.,,27 6 The Rowinsky court fundamentally
misconstrued Title IX liability in three ways. First, the court repeat-
edly emphasized that Title X's proscription against discrimination ap-
plies only to the acts of grant recipients, reasoning that "[i]mposing
liability for the acts of third parties would be incompatible with the
purpose of a spending condition, because grant recipients have little
control over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably vio-
late the prohibitions of title IX."2 77 The court clearly misinterpreted
the plaintiffs lawsuit as an attempt to hold the school liable for the
behavior of one of its students.278 Rather, the plaintiff in Rowinsky
expressly sought to hold the school, a grant recipient, liable for its
own conduct, namely "its failure to take appropriate measures in the
face of a known sexually hostile environment."279
272 Id. at 12,039-40. Conversely, a school can avoid Title IX liability "if, upon notice of
hostile environment harassment, a school takes immediate and appropriate steps to rem-
edy the hostile environment." Id.
273 See Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions,
59 Fed. Reg. 11,448, 11,449 (1994).
274 The EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex state that " [w]ith respect
to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows
or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appro-
priate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 (1980).
275 Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996).
276 Williams & Brake, supra note 43, at 429.
277 Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.
278 See Williams & Brake, supra note 43, at 430.
279 Id. at 431; see also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,036 (stating
the OCR's belief that Rowinsky was based on the mistaken fear of holding a school liable for
the actions of a harassing student, "rather than for the school's own discrimination in
failing to respond once it knows that the harassment is happening").
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In addition, the Rowinsky court erroneously relied on the absence
of a "key ingredient-a power relationship between the harasser and
the victim"-to reject the use of Title VII standards in the context of
peer sexual harassment situations. 280 In reality, however, a power dy-
namic is central to the problem of peer sexual harassment.281 Verbal
sexual harassment among students frequently occurs in the context of
presumptions that women are generally inferior or less competent
than men.28 2 This form of sexual harassment is usually expressed in
the form of" 'prove [-it words boys..., exchange to show that they are
strong,"' and gestures, such as "'pointing at [the girls], reducing
them, cutting them down to size,"' 283 frequently accompany verbal
sexual harassment. 'Young men soon learn that acting out their con-
tempt for women is a way of confirming their own manhood."28 4 Male
rumors about female students' sexual activity and promiscuity,
"whether fabricated or real, empower young men at the same time as
[they] disempower young women because of the double standard that
exists in relation to male-female sexual activity."285
Rampant sexual harassment between students is breeding a new
generation of male sexual harassers,286 and "[w] hen the sexual harass-
ment that young women experience at school is tolerated, educators
contribute to the reproduction of a patriarchal society in which men
frequently use violence to express their sexual domination over wo-
men."287 In this manner, "'[s] chools help to reproduce, rather than
to change the existing imbalance of power between men and wo-
men."' 288 For these reasons, contrary to the court's conclusion in
Rowinsky, the key ingredient of power is not missing from the situation
of peer sexual harassment. Rather, sexual harassment between stu-
280 Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011 n.11.
281 See Jones, supra note 14, at 33 ("Schools do not exist in a social vacuum. They
reflect and reproduce the power relations within a male supremacist society-a society in
which the dominant group (men) ultimately maintain their power position through
force.").
282 See Larkin, supra note 15, at 268.
283 Id. at 263 (quoting MARGART ATWOOD, CAT'S EYE 244-45 (1988)).
284 Id. at 264.
285 Id. at 270.
286 See Roscoe et al., supra note 104, at 522 (noting that "[m]ost studies show that
about one-half of adult sexual offenders committed their first act of sexual aggression as an
adolescent and that these offenses increased in severity and frequency over time").
287 Larkin, supra note 15, at 264; see alsoJones, supra note 14, at 33 ("Male violence in
mixed schools serves to support boys as they practi[c]e their sexual domination over girls
and it attempts to teach girls that it is 'natural' for them to be tyrannized by men into a
subordinate position.").
288 Larkin, supra note 15, at 264 (citation omitted) (noting that schools finl to acknowl-
edge the extent to which young women are victims of sexual harassment, they fail to recog-
nize the tremendous impact that these harassment experiences have on women's lives, and
they fail to intervene to stop the harassment).
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dents is simply a manifestation of the premature gender power strug-
gle that will one day extend into the workplace.
Finally, the Rowinsky court failed to recognize that, because a fe-
male employee can suffer harassment at the hands of her co-worker or
a subordinate employee, the essential element of hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment is not necessarily power. The key to hos-
tile work environment sexual harassment is that the harassing
behavior is nonconsensual; in short, "the recipient must not desire or
welcome the sexual advance."28 9 Such nonconsensual behavior is ar-
guably more prevalent in schools than in the workplace. 290 Viewing it
from this perspective, Tide IX sexual harassment clearly encompasses
situations where a boy grabs a girl's breast or tries to undo her bra
strap, when she does not desire this attention. Even if one assumes
that no real power relationship exists between a peer sexual harasser
and his or her victim, hostile work environment analysis still properly
applies to hostile educational environment cases because the behavior
is nonconsensual.
2. Davis: Misinterpreting Title IX on the Second Try
The Eleventh Circuit's first opinion in Davis291 was a landmark
decision that stood as a guide for many district courts.292 However, in
its en banc rehearing,293 the court's decision and rationale, like those
in Rowinsky, fail to comport with Franklin and Title IX in fundamental
ways. The en banc court's examination of the legislative history, upon
which its decision is largely based, is one-sided and ignores basic
Supreme Court precedent and explicit OCR guidelines. First, "the
mere fact that student-on-student sexual harassment may not have
been specifically mentioned in the Congressional debates does not
mean that it was not encompassed within Congress's broad intent of
preventing students from being 'subjected to discrimination' in feder-
ally funded educational programs." 294 Under the majority's extremely
narrow view of Title IX's legislative history, even claims alleging the
same teacher-on-student hostile environment sexual harassment that
the Supreme Court recognized in Franklin, would not be actiona-
289 LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 12.
290 See AAUW SuRvE, supra note 16, at 7 (finding that 81% of students surveyed had
experienced unwanted or unwelcomed sexual harassment).
291 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193-95 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91
F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd en ban4 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
292 See supra note 222.
293 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (1 1th Cir.) (en banc), petition
for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
294 Id. at 1413 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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ble.295 Furthermore, the majority's surprising conclusion that when
Congress used the unqualified phrase, "discrimination under any edu-
cation program,"296 it "only intended to cover the narrow areas of ad-
missions, services, and employment"297 further distorts common sense
and the plain meaning of the statute.
E. The Proper Test Under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII, an employer can be liable for a coworker's har-
assment,298 as well as for hostile work environment harassment.2 99
Students who are sexually harassed by their peers deserve as much
protection in their school environment as employees who are
harassed by their coworkers. 300 Therefore, the liability of schools for
sex discrimination under Title IX is properly extended by analogy to
Title VII to include claims for sexual harassment by peers, when it is
so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile educational environment.
If a school knew, or should have known, that a hostile environment
created by another student existed in the school, and if it took no
action to remedy the situation, then the school should be held liable
for monetary damages under Title IX. More specifically, a school
should be held liable if the plaintiff can prove: (1) that s/he was a
member of the protected group;30' (2) that s/he was subject to unwel-
come conduct of a sexual nature;30 2 (3) that the harassment was based
on sex;303 (4) that the harassment was "severe, persistent, or pervasive"
enough to have altered the conditions of her learning environ-
295 See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). As Judge Barkett stated, "[s]urely the majority
would not suggest that the cause of action that the Supreme Court recognized in Franklin
does not exist simply because it was not specifically mentioned in the legislative history."
Id. at 1414 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
296 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
297 Davis, 120 F.3d at 14 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
298 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing what
remedial actions an employer can take to shield itself from Title VII liability for sexual
harassment by coworkers).
299 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
300 See Gant, supra note 82, at 508 (noting that the next step, after the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that courts may award damages under Title IX in a case of teacher-to-
student sexual harassment, "is to offer students who are sexually harassed by their peers as
much protection under the law as employees who are harassed by co-workers").
301 Title IX protects any "person" from sex discrimination. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Thus, both male and female students are protected from peer sexual harassment. See Sex-
ual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,039.
302 See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,040 ("Conduct is unwel-
come if the student did not request or invite it and 'regarded the conduct as undesirable
or offensive.'") (citation omitted).
303 Title IX prohibits sex discrimination "on the basis of sex." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a).
This includes sexual harassment "regardless of the sex of the harasser, i.e., even if the
harasser and the [victim] are members of the same sex." Sexual Harassment Guidance,
supra note 105, at 12,039.
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ment;30 4 and (5) that the appropriate school officials failed to take
prompt and remedial action,30 5 despite having actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment.30 6
The final element of this test is a point of contention for federal
courts utilizing Tide VII principles in Tide IX sexual harassment
cases. Currently, the courts disagree on the appropriate standard for
institutional liability in cases involving both the sexual harassment of a
student by a teacher30 7 and peer sexual harassment.308 Courts that
have held that Tide IX requires actual notice of the alleged sexual
harassment to find school liability maintain that because Congress
adopted Tide IX pursuant to the Spending Clause, monetary recovery
is available only in cases of intentional discrimination of a grant recipi-
ent.30 9 Given that Title VII's "'should have known' prong . . . is a
standard based on negligence, not intent, ... [and n]egligence can-
not support a monetary award for a claim brought under Spending
Clause legislation .... a 'should have known' standard cannot create
304 Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,041. In evaluating the harass-
ing behavior for pervasiveness, courts should consider the conduct from an objective and
subjective perspective, and should take into account all relevant circumstances: whether
the harassment negatively affected more than one student's educational environment; the
"type, frequency, and duration of the conduct"; the "identity and relationship" between the
perpetrator and the harassment victim(s); the number of students involved; the "age and
sex" of the individuals involved; the "size of the school, location of the incidents, and con-
text in which they occurred"; whether or not other similar incidents also occurred at the
school; the occurrence of other "incidents of gender-based, but non-sexual, harassment."
Id. at 12,041-42.
305 See id. at 12,042. A school must take "immediate and appropriate steps to investi-
gate or otherwise determine what occurred and take steps reasonably calculated to end any
harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harass-
ment from occurring again." Id.
306 See id. A school has constructive knowledge when it "should have known" about the
sexual harassment through the exercise of reasonable care. Id.
307 Compare Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
Tide VII's actual and constructive notice applies to Title IX hostile environment sexual
harassment claims) with Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that school districts are not liable for Tide IX teacher-student harassment
unless a supervisor "actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, and failed
to do so") (citing Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997)),
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct 595 (1997).
308 Compare Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., No. 95-402-SD, 1997 WL 832794, at *8
(D.N.H. Aug. 25, 1997) (applying the "knew-or-should-have-known standard" in a peer sex-
ual harassment case) with Doe v. University of Ill., Nos. 96-3511, 96-4148, 1998 WL 88341,
at *8 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998) (holding that a school "may be held liable for... student-on-
student sexual harassment. . . , provided the [school] actually knew that the harassment
was taking place").
309 See, e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 1997). The
Seventh Circuit in Smith held that "a school district is liable for teacher-student sexual
harassment 'only if a school official who had actual knowledge of the abuse was invested by
the school board with the duty to supervise the employee and the power to take action that
would end such abuse and failed to do so.'" Id. at 1034 (quoting Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660).
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institutional liability under Tide IX."31 0 However, more persuasive
reasoning comes from the courts that have held constructive notice-
that the school knew or should have known about the harassment-is
sufficient for Tide IX institutional liability. Proponents of this stan-
dard argue that "the plain meaning of Tide IX and the Franklin deci-
sion.., put school districts on notice that they [are] liable for failing
to take steps reasonably calculated to end ... sexual harassment of
which they knew or should have known."311 Furthermore, construc-
tive notice only holds "an educational institution directly liable for its
own misconduct in failing to stop ongoing intentional discrimina-
tion."31 2 Rather than opening the liability floodgates, this standard
imposes educational liability only where (1) "[the school] has actual
knowledge of the sexual harassment"; (2) "the atmosphere at the
school is so permeated with harassment that the school must have
known of the harassment"; or (3) "[the school] knew enough underly-
ing facts to support a reasonable conclusion that actionable sexual
harassment was occurring.1313 The OCR guidelines also advocate the
use of a "knew or should have known" standard for institutional liabil-
ity.314 The Supreme Court will hand down the final word on this is-
sue-at least for teacher-student sexual harassment-when it decides
Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School District later this term.315 However,
for now, a few courts' adoption of the higher actual notice standard
should not have too negative an impact on peer sexual harassment
litigation because, as the case discussion above indicates,31 6 these
cases almost always involve situations in which parents complained re-
peatedly to school officials about the sexual harassment of their
children.
IV
AVOIDING POTENTIAL LiAiarrry UNDER Tn-LB IX: CREATING,
IMPLEMENTING, AND ENFORCING A SEXUAL
HARAssMENT POLICY
As the preceding Sections of this Note indicate, the problem of
student-to-student sexual harassment and its treatment under Title IX
310 Id. at 1029 (citations omitted).
311 Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Sys., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
312 Oyster River, 1997 WL at *9 (D.N.H. Aug. 25, 1997). The court in Oyster River held
that "an educational institution can be liable under Title IX for student-on-student sexual
harassment if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take measures
reasonably calculated to end it." Id. at *10.
313 Id. (citations omitted).
314 Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,039.
315 See Greenhouse, supra note 69, § 1, at 22.
316 See supra Part II and cases discussed therein.
1998] 1057
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
remains unsettled. 317 Unfortunately for school officials, students, and
parents, no end to the confusion is in sight.3 18 Consequently, school
officials continue to operate without clear guidance and must "de-
pend upon the advice of their own lawyers about how to react to inci-
dents of harassment."319 However, one thing is clear-schools that do
not guard against the sexual harassment of their students-whether
employees or other students are the perpetrators-face the threat of
litigation, exposure to considerable damages, and payment of attor-
neys' fees. 320
In light of such concerns, what should a lawyer advise a school to
do? Unfortunately, "[e]ducators are often unaware of sexual harass-
ment of students in their institutions until they have been involved in
a sex discrimination lawsuit. '321 Perhaps the only definite advice that
a lawyer can give to a concerned school is to be proactive, not reactive,
in terms of confronting the issue of student sexual harassment.3 22
Here, the employment context teaches another lesson. In April 1996,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed the largest sex-
ual harassment lawsuit ever against Mitsubishi Motors.3 23 The EEOC
alleged that hundreds of employees had been sexually harassed, and
that Mitsubishi took no effective action to prevent or correct the
problems.3 24 As a reaction to the lawsuit and the accompanying nega-
317 Opening a new term on October 7, 1996, the Supreme Court declined to render
any new legal guidance on this issue, and chose to stay out of the growing debate when it
denied certiorari to the appellants in Rowinsky. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 117 S.
Ct. 165 (1996) (denying certiorari); see also Lyle Denniston, High Court Refuses to Take up
Student Sexual Harassment Case: As New Term Begins, Justices Opt to Stay out of Growing Contro-
versy, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 8, 1996, at 3A.
318 It appears that the Court may be considering review of Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). See Ron Martz, High Court Could Get
Forsyth Suit: Sex Harassment at School Is Issue, ATrLANrAJ. CoNsT.,Jan. 27, 1998, at B4 (report-
ing on the Supreme Court's recent request for the Justice Department's opinion on the
issue of school liability for peer sexual harassment, perhaps "to determine if there really is
a conflict in federal court rulings on the same issue or whether there are different issues at
stake"). However, the answer could take months, and it is very unlikely that the Court
would grant certiorari to Davis and issue a decision before Spring 1999. See id.
319 Denniston, supra note 317, at 3A.
320 See Imvis & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 21.
321 Id. at 20.
322 See id. at 21.
323 See Kathy McKinney, Car Maker Faces Lawsuit: Could Be EEOC's Largest Harassment
Complaint, THE PANTAGRAPH, Apr. 9, 1996, at Al [hereinafter McKinney, Car Maker Faces
Lawsuit]. The case grew out of "reports of male employees repeatedly grabbing women's
buttocks, breasts and genitals," "an air gun used on the assembly line being shot off be-
tween a woman's legs," genital drawings "on car fenders and cardboard signs on the assem-
bly line," repeated questions to women workers about their sexual conduct, and ridicule
and physical threats to women who complained. See Kathy McKinney, Automaker Sued: Suit
Claims More Than 100 Cases of Sexual Harassment at Plant, THE PANTAGRAPH, Apr. 10, 1996, at
A12.
324 See McKinney, Car Maker Faces Lawsui4 supra note 323, at Al.
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tive press,3 25 Mitsubishi hired former Congresswoman and U.S. Labor
Secretary Lynn Martin to head a task force to study its workplace and
to recommend changes to create a "model workplace environ-
ment. '3 26 Martin unveiled a thirty-four point roadmap that Mitsubishi
plans to implement over the next two years.3 27 The roadmap recom-
mends sweeping changes that go far beyond sexual harassment.3 28 So
far, the scandal has cost Mitsubishi $9.5 million to settle a related pri-
vate lawsuit brought by twenty-seven individual plaintiffs.3 29
One thing is clear for schools. Taking a "boys will be boys"'33 0 or
"children can be so cruel" attitude is not sufficient in a world where
"the law ... in most states ... requires schools to have sexual harass-
ment policies,"33' and some courts are appropriately holding schools
liable under Title X.33 2 Furthermore, it is essential for students' psy-
chological well-being and for the integrity of the learning environ-
ment that school officials approach the issue of peer sexual
harassment with the same seriousness that it devotes to other preva-
lent problems in the school environment, such as gang-violence and
teenage drug and alcohol abuse. Taking the following steps can help
schools address the problem of student-to-student sexual harassment
and avoid potential liability under Title IX.
A. Adopt a Written Sexual Harassment Policy
The first step schools must take is to adopt a written sexual har-
assment policy. "Many courts have found the key determination in
cases of sexual harassment is the presence or absence of an effective,
publicized and consistently enforced sexual harassment policy and
complaint procedure."333 Though a school may face liability even if it
does have a sexual harassment policy, the absence of such a policy will
certainly increase the chances that the school district will incur liabil-
325 The Rainbow Coalition, which Reverend Jesse Jackson and the National Organiza-
tion of Women headed, led a joint boycott of Mitsubishi products. See Kathy McKinney,
Martin to Detail Mitsubishi Report Next Week, THE PANTAGRAPH, Feb. 8, 1997, at Cl.
326 Id.
327 See Rochelle Sharpe, Report on Mitsubishi Motors U.S. Plant: Seeks Changes Beyond Is-
sues in Bias Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1997, at B7.
328 See id. The report suggests, among other things, that Mitsubishi "change its sexual-
harassment-complaint procedure, create a discipline committee, increase employee train-
ing and launch a 'zero tolerance task force' to prevent harassment." Id.
329 See Kirsten Downey Grimsley & Frank Swoboda, Mitsubishi Settlement Said to Total
$9.5 Million: Company Still Faces Larger Suit Filed by EEOC, WASHINGTON PosT, Aug. 30, 1997,
at Fl.
330 Lawis & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 25 (stating a "boys will be boys" response by
schools to sexual harassment "[m]ay [b]e [c]ostly").
331 How Schools Handle Sexual Harassmen USA WEEKEND, Sept. 6, 1996, at 16 (emphasis
added).
332 See supra Part Hl.A.
333 Lawis & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 37 (italics omitted).
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ity.as 4 Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for schools to draft and
enforce a written "zero-toleration sexual harassment policy" 35 that ap-
plies to both employees and students, and makes dear that the school
will not permit or condone sexual harassment on its campus. The
adoption of such a policy demonstrates that there is a real commit-
ment on the part of the administration to provide an educational envi-
ronment free of sexually harassing conduct.33 6 It can also "open the
lines of communication [that] encourag[e] victims to report harass-
ment without fear of repercussions." 337
There is no doubt that "trying to write detailed regulations about
what is permissible between boys and girls during their most chaotic
years ... makes drafting the Code of Federal Regulations look easy."33 8
Writing a sexual harassment policy that addresses the multifaceted be-
havior of students is a delicate balancing procedure. On the one
hand, it is not appropriate to implement a policy that punishes simply
flirtatious behavior; on the other hand, schools cannot tolerate peer
behavior that is really harassment by dismissing it as "youthful
exuberance."33 9
Clarity is key. "A clear policy will facilitate handling cases and
create a school-wide awareness of sexual harassment which may pro-
duce a hostile environment."340 The sexual harassment policy should
clearly define what conduct constitutes sexual harassment in terms the
334 See LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 118. Title IX requires schools "to adopt and publish a
policy against sex discrimination and grievance procedures providing for prompt and equi-
table resolution of complaints of discrimination on the basis of sex." Sexual Harassment
Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,044 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1997)). While Tide IX
does not require schools to adopt a specific sexual harassment policy or a grievance proce-
dure reserved for sexual harassment complaints, schools can encounter problems if their
general nondiscrimination policies and grievance procedures do not provide an "effective
means for preventing and responding to sexual harassment." Id.
335 LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 121 (citing a "zero-toleration sexual harassment policy" as
the first step schools can take to prevent sexual harassment); see also AAUW SURVEY, supra
note 16, at 21 (stating that "[a]t the most basic [level], schools must have sexual harass-
ment policies that are clearly communicated and routinely enforced").
336 See CARRIE HERBERT, SExUAL HARAssMENT IN ScHooLs: A GUIDE FOR TEAcHERS 46
(1992); see also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,040 ("By having a strong
policy against sex discrimination and accessible, effective, and fairly applied grievance pro-
cedures, a school is telling its students that it does not tolerate sexual harassment and that
students can report it without fear of adverse consequences."); Larkin, supra note 15, at
276 (asserting that "[t]he development and implementation of a sexual harassment policy
that covers students is a strong, public statement that school boards acknowledge and they
will not tolerate the sexually harassing behavi[or] to which many students are subjected").
337 LEwis & HAsTINGs, supra note 18, at 1.
338 Margaret Carlson, Washington Diary: No More Teachers' Silly Rules, TIME, Oct. 21,
1996, at 27.
339 Williams & Brake, supra note 43, at 424.
340 Chantal N. Senatus, Note, Peer Harassment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972: Where's the Intent?, 24 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 379, 407 (1997).
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students can understand.341 It should also give examples of the types
of prohibited behavior 34 2-to put students on notice of the exact be-
havior that the school will not tolerate.343 The policy should be flexi-
ble enough to address the different types and varying degrees of
sexual harassment.3 44 For example, "[c] onsideration must be given to
verbal, non-verbal and physical harassment, graffiti, sexually explicit
material, flashing and other manifestations of unwanted attention."3 45
The policy should describe potential perpetrators and victims.
3 46
Because there is no one way to deal with all cases, the policy should
341 See, e.g., Maria Giordano, Board Broadens Harass Policy, NEw ORatANs TimEs-PIcA-
YuNE, July 17, 1997, at BI (reporting on St. Charles Parish School Board's adoption of a
new policy regarding student sexual harassment that defines sexual harassment as "any
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature") (internal quotation marks omitted); Laura Pace, Harassment the
Target of a New Policy, PrTSBURGH PosT-GAzmrE, Aug. 6, 1997, at S1 (reporting on a new
sexual harassment policy for Mt. Lebanon High School which states that "[s]exual harass-
ment includes, but is not limited to, unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
sexually motivated physical contact and/or verbal, visual or physical conduct of a sexual
nature"); Shelby School Panel Tightens Definitions of Harassment; COM. APPEAL, Sept. 26, 1997,
at A15 (reporting on a new sexual harassment policy for Shelby County schools that de-
fines harassment as "conduct, advances, gestures or words either written or spoken that
interfere with someone's work or a student's education, that create a hostile learning or
work environment, or imply that one must submit to advances to earn grades or continue
to work"); Zion Lutheran Schools Board, Student/Youth Sexual Harassment (last modified
Dec. 21, 1993) <http//www.writetype.com/sbm/02-05-06.html> (defining sexual harass-
ment "as including but not limited to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, repeated derogatory sexist remarks, and other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a
sexual nature directed toward a student").
342 See, e.g., Pace, supra note 341, at S1 (reporting on a new sexual harassment policy
under which harassment may include "unwelcomed touching, leering, staring, sexual flirta-
tions, propositions, pressures for sexual activities, sexual slurs, threats, spreading of sexual
rumors, repeated demeaning remarks or unwelcomed jokes"); Zion Lutheran Schools
Board, supra note 341 (listing types of sexual harassment that include verbal examples-
'sexually demeaning comments, sexually explicit statements, questions, slurs, jokes, anec-
dotes, or epithets"; written examples-"suggestive or obscene letters, notes, or invitations";
physical examples--"sexual assault, touching, impeding or blocking movement"; visual ex-
amples--"leering, gestures, displays of sexually suggestive objects or pictures, cartoons, or
posters"; "continu[ed] express[ions of] sexual interest after being informed that the inter-
est is unwelcomed"; and the "making [of] reprisal, or threats of reprisal following a nega-
tive response to sexual advances, or following a sexual harassment complaint").
343 See LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 122.
344 See id. at 123. In a study of four Canadian high schools, the author divided student
sexual harassment experiences into four categories: verbal harassment (including "put-
downs" by male students such as "witch," "bitch," "dog," "bimbo," "baby," "chick"); physical
harassment (consisting of "grabbing, touching, rubbing, pushing, pinching, kicking, slap-
ping, and sexual assault"); and visual harassment (comprising "leering, ogling, sexual ges-
turing, teas ing] with pornography"). Larkin, supra note 15, at 268-74; see also TILL, supra
note 112, at 7-8 (defining a "hierarchical continuum" of sexual harassment: "general[ized]
sexist remarks or behavior"; "[i]nappropriate and offensive, but essentially sanction-free
sexual advances"; sexual activity or behavior solicited by "promise of reward"; sexual activity
coerced "by threat of punishment"; and "[s]exual assaults").
345 HERBERT, supra note 336, at 49.
346 See Roscoe et al., supra note 104, at 521.
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delineate how the school will address different types of discrimination:
"adult to adult, adult to student, student to adult, student to stu-
dent."3 47 It should state the disciplinary penalties that the school may
impose for each type of violation. Penalties for violations of the policy
should take into consideration "the frequency of the harassment";
"the age of the victim"; the relationship between the perpetrator and
the victim; the "nature" of the harassment; the location and time of
the conduct; and the "wishes" of the victim. 348 Finally, the school
should update and modify the policy as needed.
B. Establish a Complaint Procedure
The procedure that schools implement for reporting harassment
complaints must "establish and maintain open lines of communica-
tion with educators, administrators and students."3 49 The procedure
should create a confidential environment in which the school encour-
ages students to report any harassment that they experience. °50 "As-
surances of confidentiality, to the greatest degree possible, will ...
increase reporting."351 The sexual harassment policy should be clear
regarding the procedure for filing a grievance,35 2 and should include
information on how to document sexually harassing behavior as well
as a widely disseminated list of trained personnel to whom students
can make formal complaints. 353 Possible individuals to whom stu-
347 HERBERT, supra note 336, at 49.
348 Id. at 50.
349 LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 39.
350 See LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 121. There are several reasons why victims of sexual
harassment stay silent or try to deal with harassment without involving school administra-
tion: anxiety that they are in some way responsible for the incident(s); fear that people will
not believe them; shame at their involvement "in any form of sexual incident"; a belief that
nothing will be done about their complaint; a fear of retaliation by the harasser. TiLL,
supra note 112, at 28.
351 LEwis & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 39. See, e.g., Zion Lutheran Schools Board,
supra note 341 (stating that "[e]very effort shall be made to protect the privacy of parties
involved in any complaint," and that "[files pertaining to complaints are confidential and
will only be discussed when necessary for the investigation and/or resolution of the
matter").
352 Grievance procedures can be either informal or formal. "Informal procedures
place the responsibility on the complainant to attempt to negotiate an end to the harass-
ment by confronting the harasser candidly and directly." LAYMAN, supra note 15, at 151.
"Formal procedures are more adversarial and require the filing of a written complaint,
investigation, and a factual finding of guilt or innocence." Id. at 152. See, e.g., Giordano,
supra note 341, at BI (reporting on St. Charles Parish School Board's adoption of a new
student sexual harassment policy with a formal procedure for addressing complaints,
under which students can file a harassment report with the assistant principal); Zion Lu-
theran Schools Board, supra note 341 (providing a three-step complaint procedure with
both informal and formal components, ranging from directly confronting the person re-
sponsible for the conduct, to appealing the Senior Partner's adverse decision to the Gov-
erning Board).
353 See HERBERT, supra note 336, at 50.
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dents can complain if they believe they have been sexually harassed
include "any principal, assistant principal, administrator, guidance
counselor, psychologist, teacher, or school nurse."3 54
C. Educate Supervisors, Employees, Students, Teachers, and
Parents About the Policy and Reporting Procedure
The AAUW Survey documented many alarming statistics, includ-
ing that more than half of the surveyed students (57%) were unaware
of whether their school had a sexual harassment policy.355 "Education
is the key to prevention,"3 56 and "the more efforts that are taken to
educate and inform the educational population of harassment and
the policy against it, the greater the likelihood that the institution will
be absolved of liability for harassment."357 Therefore, an important
step in addressing and preventing peer sexual harassment is educat-
ing students, teachers, and parents on how to identify sexual harass-
ment, how to report it, and how to respond to an allegation.358 At the
very least, the school should disseminate the policy widely and "[a]U
school personnel,... staff, parents and students, should have access to
a copy of the sexual harassment policy."359 Appropriate places for
posting the policy include lunch rooms, lounges, hallways, bulletin
boards, and official handbooks.3 60 The school should redisseminate
the policy on a regular basis, perhaps yearly.361
Posting and distribution of the policy should accompany training
and discussion for everyone involved.362 "It can be highly advanta-
geous to gather information from students regarding experiences
with sexual harassment behaviors prior to an educational program
since this information can be used for illustration purposes and to
354 Pace, supra note 341, at S1.
355 AAUW SURVEY, supra note 16, at 21.
356 Larkin, supra note 15, at 277 (internal quotes omitted); see also Sexual Harassment
Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,034 (noting that "school personnel who understand their
obligations under Title IX are in the best position to prevent harassment and to lessen the
harm to students if, despite their best efforts, harassment occurs").
357 Lxwis & HASTINGs, supra note 18, at 41.
358 The OCR has developed a useful pamphlet for conveying basic information regard-
ing parties' rights and responsibilities under Title IX. OFFICE FOR CrIL RIGHTS, supra note
1.
359 HERBERT, supra note 336, at 52. See, e.g., Zion Lutheran Schools Board, supra note
341 (posting a copy of the policy in each administrative office, providing a copy to all
currently enrolled students, distributing a copy at all orientation programs for new stu-
dents, placing the policy in all Zion policy manuals, and providing a copy for all members
of the faculty, administrative staff, and support staff).
360 See LEwis & HAsTINGs, supra note 18, at 40.
361 See id.
362 SeeHERBERT, supra note 336, at 52; LA-vAN, supra note 15, at 120. "Ageisafactorto
be considered ... when determining what type of education or training to provide to
students in order to prevent sexual harassment from occurring." Sexual Harassment Gui-
dance, supra note 105, at 12,034.
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attract and maintain students' interest."363 Educational strategies in-
clude distributing questionnaires, conducting in-service workshops,364
and incorporating sexual harassment into the regular curriculum.3 65
Review of peer harassment issues and policies can take place in public
hearings, interviews, and evaluations.3 66 Schools should encourage
student government and organizations to become involved in the ef-
fort. "Periodic or regular newsletters distributed to employees and
students could contain additional information regarding the policy,
reporting procedure or harassment."3 67 Additionally, sexual harass-
ment training should be a regular part of the orientation of any new
student or employee.
D. Address Complaints and Conduct Investigations
Schools should investigate and resolve all sexual harassment com-
plaints, large and small, in a quick and equitable manner.368 The
strategy should be to remedy the situation as quickly as possible and to
protect the privacy and confidentiality of the students involved.369 A
school's prompt and corrective response to reported harassment can
limit its liability in later suits. 370 Furthermore, "[p] rompt action will
prevent the escalation of smaller incidents like teasing."371 Because it
is unclear exactly what student behavior might be actionable and cre-
ate institutional liability, "educators should err on the conservative
side, promptly investigating complaints and sincerely enforcing any
policies via appropriate warnings and discipline."372
Taking into consideration the age and maturity of the students
involved when addressing allegations of sexual harassment will pro-
mote an appropriate response to allegations and will guard against
overreaction. 373 "[A] ge is relevant in determining whether sexual har-
assment occurred in the first instance, as well as in determining the
363 Roscoe et al., supra note 104, at 521 (emphasis omitted).
364 See, e.g., Lisa Renfro & Steve Moore, Sexual Harassment Forum Educates Parents, THE
PRESS-ENRPRISE, Nov. 7, 1996, at B9 (reporting on a forum for parents at West Valley
High School that addressed "how to identify sexual harassment, how to report it and how
to respond when an allegation is made").
365 See Roscoe et al., supra note 104, at 521 (recommending "that educational sessions
be held at the intermediate school level to inform students about sexual harassment and its
potential consequences to both victims and perpetrators").
366 See LEis & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 41. Another idea involves setting up sup-
port groups for female students to share their experiences and to discuss appropriate ac-
tion. SeeJones, supra note 14, at 35.
367 LEwis & HAsrrNGs, supra note 18, at 41.
368 See L aN, supra note 15, at 121.
369 See id.
370 See Senatus, supra note 340, at 406-07.
371 Id. at 407.
372 LEwis & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 28.
373 See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,034.
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appropriate response by the school."3 74 In cases like Johnathan's and
De'Andre's, 75 a general student conduct code, rather than a specific
sexual harassment policy, may provide a more "age-appropriate"
method of handling innocent but unwelcome kisses that "do[] not
rise to the level of harassment prohibited by Title IX.,,3 76 In the final
analysis, a sexual harassment policy should guide, but not replace reli-
ance on judgment and common sense.3 77
CONCLUSION
Schools serve as the "principal instrument in awakening [chil-
dren] to cultural values, in preparing [them] for later professional
training, and in helping [them] to adjust normally to [their] environ-
ment."378 Sexual harassment interferes with these common goals of
education,3 79 the very goals that Title IX seeks to advance. Children
are legally required to go to school-they do not have a choice:
"[t]hey have a right to feel safe" and unthreatened in the school envi-
ronment.380 More importantly, "[a] safe and equitable learning envi-
ronment is fundamental to academic success."3 1 Getting an
education is difficult enough without adding the additional obstacle
of rampant sexual harassment in school.3 8 2 Sexual harassment inter-
feres with the education of a student, and turns an environment of
learning into one of humiliation.383 The potential for physical and
psychological damage as a result of sexual harassment is great: "Girls
stop eating, fall ill and see their grades plummet .... [Bloys learn
attitudes that carry over to the adult workplace .... 3 8 4 Furthermore,
the consequences may be permanent: "Being harassed at school
teaches young women to accept this behavi[or] as an inevitable com-
ponent of their everyday life."385 Finally, sexual harassment in school
374 Id. The OCR Guidelines state that age considerations can help determine
"whether a student welcomed the conduct and... whether the conduct was severe, persis-
tent, or pervasive." Id.
375 See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
376 Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 105, at 12,034.
377 See id.
378 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Lvis & HAsTnNGs, supra
note 18, at 25 ("[rlecognizing that school teaches [children] social skills, as well as aca-
demic [skills].").
379 See Roscoe et al., supra note 104, at 515 (noting that sexual harassment hinders
learning, "making it an issue of concern" with regard to older adolescents "since the mid-
1970s").
380 Bryant, supra note 89, at 40.
381 AAUW SuRvzv, supra note 16, at 15.
382 See id. at 21.
383 See Lehrman, supra note 9, at A16.
384 Id. (citing court testimony and educators).
385 Larkin, supra note 15, at 264. The sexual harassment that young women encounter
at school establishes "a precedent for the type of behavi[or] they expect[ ] to encounter
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is even more devastating to young women because education is the
path to future jobs and financial security.3 86 "The vast disparity be-
tween men and women in the workforce makes it obvious that the
underpinnings of sexual harassment begins [sic] well before entry
into the workforce."38 7
Sexual harassment is unwelcomed sexual conduct, including sex-
ualjokes, comments, gossip, pinching, touching, blocking movement,
or actual sexual assault.38 8 If an employee does not have to tolerate
unwanted groping or sexual innuendo in the workplace, neither
should a girl or boy in the classroom. Though it is easy to make light
of Johnathan's and De'Andre's stories, the reality is that student-to-
student sexual harassment is creating a hostile environment thatjeop-
ardizes the educational, emotional, and behavioral lives of America's
children.389 In response, most parents do not want to sue, "they want
the harassment [of their child] to stop."390 They only sue after their
complaints to teachers, principals, and superintendents go un-
heeded.391 The challenge facing schools today is to address com-
plaints, and to ensure that harassment does not continue.392
Until that happens, the courts should continue to hold schools
liable for money damages under Tite IX when they fail to react in an
appropriate and timely manner to student and parental complaints of
persistent harassment. Application of Title VII principles and stan-
dards in the school setting is appropriate and necessary. 393 Perhaps
liability is the wake-up call schools need to compel them to approach
the problem with the seriousness that it deserves. However, fear of
liability should not push schools to the other extreme in attempting to
regulate behavior and interaction among students.394 Mutual respect
and responsible behavior is a lesson that today's children and young
adults need to learn, and it is the lesson that teachers should teach in
the classroom along with reading, writing, and math.
elsewhere.... As one student put it, 'If you get treated badly here, you know you can
expect to get the same thing in public.'" Id.
386 See 118 CONG. REc. S5804 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Senator Bayh).
387 LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 18, at 25.
388 See LAmunAa, supra note 15, at 17.
389 See AAUW SuRvEY, supra note 16, at 21.
390 IAYmAN, supra note 15, at 122.
391 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 21, at A14 (reporting the case of Tianna Ugarte, whose
parents contacted a lawyer only after the school superintendent refused to act on their
complaints of sexual harassment).
392 See Larkin, supra note 15, at 267 (explaining that her intent in conducting the study
was not to blame teachers for the peer sexual harassment that occurs in their classrooms,
but "to emphasize that [teachers] need to acknowledge and confront it").
393 See supra Part III.
394 See Lewin, supra note 27, at A22 ("Education experts say the fear of liability has led
some schools to go to extremes, whether by forbidding students to hold hands or, as in
both Queens and North Carolina, suspending boys for kisses on the cheek.").
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By refusing to address the problem of peer sexual harassment in
their schools, "administrators not only increase their own liability,
they also forego the opportunity to remedy a problem that deprives
girls of an equal education with boys."395 While implementing and
enforcing a no-tolerance sexual harassment policy can help a school
avoid liability for sexual harassment, in the end, avoiding liability is
not the best reason for acting to eliminate harassment in schools.5 96
"The best reason is that ending harassment enables all students to
pursue their education more freely, to cooperate and learn from each
other, and to contribute to their schools and community."3 97 Ulti-
mately, one hopes that the question of whether or not a school district
should be held liable for student-to-student sexual harassment be-
comes a moot point as school districts across the nation-in concert
with their principals, teachers, parents, and students-actively work to
eliminate peer sexual harassment in schools.
395 LAYmN, supra note 15, at 27.
396 See id. at 16.
397 Id.; see also LEWIS & HAsTrNGs, supra note 18, at 25 (stating that "[there are ethical
or moral reasons for burdening educational institutions with responsibility for sexual har-
assment of its students by other students").
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